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ver the last decade, growing numbers of 
investors have become increasingly 
concerned with the environmental and 
social impact of their investments across asset 
classes. This trend has recently been driven by 
new waves of “impact investors” proactively 
seeking measurable social and environmental 
impact in addition to financial returns, and by 
“responsible investors” making commitments to 
engage on environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) issues through initiatives such as the 
United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI). At the same time, engaged 
shareholders have had long-standing experience 
using “the power of the proxy” and their voices as 
investors to hold companies accountable for the 
impacts they have on employees, stakeholders, 
communities, and ecosystems. 
While investor interest in shareholder 
engagement has grown, our understanding of the 
impacts associated with engagement activities 
remains largely anecdotal. 
In 2012, an important study on Total Portfolio 
Activation provided a new conceptual and 
analytical framework for investors to pursue 
environmental and social impact across all asset 
classes commonly found in a diversified 
investment portfolio. Building upon the insights 
of Total Portfolio Activation, the Impact of 
Equity Engagement (IE2) initiative seeks to 
deepen our understanding of the nature of impact  
 
in one specific asset class—public equities—
where investors’ engagement activities have 
generated meaningful social and environmental 
impacts. 
Given the large social and environmental 
footprints of publicly traded corporations and the 
persistently high allocation to public equities in 
most investor portfolios, public equity investing 
presents a major opportunity for impact 
investing. Yet impact investing, as currently 
practiced, has concentrated primarily on small-
scale direct investments in private equity and 
debt, where many investors perceive that social 
and environmental impact can be more readily 
observed than in publicly traded companies 
where ownership is intermediated, diluted, and 
diffused through secondary capital markets. 
Indeed, the nature of impact within public equity 
investing remains poorly understood and 
insufficiently documented. Because of this, many 
investors may be overlooking readily available 
opportunities for generating impact within their 
existing investment portfolios. 
To address these misperceptions and missed 
opportunities, the IE2 initiative is developing a 
more rigorous framework for documenting the 
impact of engagement within the public equity 
asset class.  
Over the past several decades, shareholders have 
engaged with public companies in a variety of 
O 
 ways, ranging from activities involving relatively 
little effort, such as casting a proxy vote on a 
shareholder resolution or signing onto a letter, to 
multi-year, multifaceted strategies involving 
dialogue, investigative reports, and organized 
campaigns. 
The IE2 initiative classifies engagement activities 
into four major categories: 
■ The proxy process, which allows 
shareholders to engage with a company on 
their operations through shareholder 
resolution filing and proxy voting. 
■ Dialogue with companies, which often but 
not always follows a shareholder resolution. 
An investor can initiate a direct dialogue by 
meeting with one or more companies, either 
individually or in coordination with other 
investors or civil society. 
■ Engagement on policy issues, such as seeking 
mandatory disclosure from the SEC on board 
diversity, political spending, and other issues. 
Investors may also send comment letters on 
proposed rules and regulations, produce a 
benchmarking report, or help shape industry 
regulation to promote better ESG practices. 
■ Assertive action by the investor, including 
taking legal action or becoming involved in 
campaigns, such as a divestment or public 
press campaign. 
Although widely practiced, these engagement 
activities are not tracked in consistent ways. Few 
investors have robust internal systems for 
monitoring and measuring the progress of their 
engagements, and then analyzing the results of 
their efforts systematically. Although some 
investor networks and databases keep track of 
shareholder resolutions and proxy votes, few 
track engagements that involve civil society 
coalitions and escalated engagement over time—
which the literature of the field shows to be some 
of the most highly effective forms of engagement. 
Even more significantly, few investors have any 
consistent way of documenting or measuring the 
impact of their engagement activities on long-
term social and environmental outcomes. 
The IE2 initiative therefore proposes a new 
reporting framework that would not only 
standardize and facilitate reporting of 
shareholder engagement activities, but also 
provide additional functionality for those who 
wish to: 
■ Report on individual and collaborative 
engagements to the PRI; 
■ Publish public reports on their websites or 
for their clients, donors, or stakeholders; 
■ Analyze their own engagement activity to 
identify which factors and activities are most 
effective in changing companies’ behavior; or, 
■ Promote academic and industry research on 
shareholder engagement by contributing to 
an anonymized, cloud-based database that 
would compile information from multiple 
investors, in order to help identify best 
practices and understand what maximizes 
investor leverage. 
With initial support from philanthropy and 
engaged investors, this new reporting framework 
can help investors track and report on the impact 
of their own engagements – and, eventually, to 
identify and analyze industry-wide best practices 
for impactful engagement. As these investors 
increasingly seek to achieve “Total Portfolio 
Activation”—integrating environmental, social, 
and governance outcomes across all asset 
classes—shareholder engagement with public 
equities will become an increasingly important 
piece of the total portfolio puzzle.
  
or decades, shareholders concerned with 
the social and environmental impact of 
their investments have actively engaged 
with corporations held in their portfolios. 
Successful investor engagements can foster 
changes in corporate policies and practices that 
produce meaningful impacts on employees, 
stakeholders, communities, and ecosystems 
touched by corporations, but few investors 
comprehensively document the impact of these 
engagements. However, two separate movements 
within the investment community are focusing 
increasing attention on the social and 
environmental impact of investor engagement. 
On one hand, a group of self-identified “impact 
investors,” associated with organizations such as 
the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), 
pursue measurable social and environmental 
impact, in addition to financial returns, as a 
central part of their investment process. Although 
many impact investors currently focus their 
efforts on small-scale direct investments in 
private equity and debt, increasing numbers of 
investors, inspired by “total portfolio” 
approaches to impact investing, seek 
opportunities for impact across asset classes.1 
At the same time, a growing number of global 
investors associated with the United Nations-
backed Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) have committed to become more engaged 
investors on environmental, social, and  
 
governance (ESG) issues. More than 1,250 
signatories to the PRI, with global assets under 
management of approximately $45 trillion, are 
now required to report on their activities as 
engaged investors each year and to document 
whether companies make changes to their ESG 
policies and practices in response to investors’ 
engagements. Although the PRI encourages 
investors to report on their engagement 
activities, it remains difficult to understand 
whether and how social and environmental 
impact results from this reported engagement 
activity.2 
Despite the many challenges that arise when 
trying to track and measure the impact of 
engagement, publicly traded corporations clearly 
have large environmental, social, and governance 
footprints that imprint themselves across the 
global economy.  For many investors with 
diversified investment portfolios, public equities 
also continue to constitute the largest asset class 
within their asset allocation. Consequently, listed 
equities present a major arena of opportunity 
both for impact investors seeking tangible social 
and environmental impact and for sustainable 
and responsible investors committing to become 
more engaged asset owners on ESG issues.  
Recognizing this opportunity, a group of engaged 
investors and stakeholders came together to 
explore how the impact of engagement activities 
in public equity investing could be documented 
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 and evaluated. Following an initial convening in 
Boston in December 2013, the group formalized a 
multi-stakeholder initiative known as the Impact 
of Equity Engagement (IE2). In the year since the 
convening, the coordinating research team at 
Croatan Institute analyzed the universe of 
engagement activities and developed an initial 
engagement reporting framework in close 
consultation with the initiative’s steering 
committee and numerous other experts, 
practitioners, and stakeholders. This paper 
provides a report on the initiative’s preliminary 
findings during its first phase of activity.  The 
study is based on primary and secondary 
research as well as interviews with 
approximately two dozen stakeholders—
including representatives from sustainable and 
responsible investment firms, institutional 
investors, foundations, research groups, NGOs, 
and investor networks. This paper provides 
background on the genesis of the initiative and its 
relationship to other complementary efforts in 
the field. Based on our research and analysis, we 
outline a comprehensive taxonomy of the most 
commonly used shareholder engagement 
activities, ranging from shareholder resolutions 
and the proxy process, to dialoguing with 
companies and intervening in public policy, to 
more assertive actions such as litigation and 
campaigning. Through a historical analysis of the 
emergence of shareholder engagement over the 
last five decades, a literature review, and 
numerous case studies from the field, we isolate 
key elements that make for effective 
engagements. Finally, the paper presents the 
reporting framework and the associated 
analytical toolkit that is emerging from it, which 
provide the foundation for a much deeper and 
more coherent understanding of the complex 
nature of impact that engagement with publicly 
traded companies can stimulate.  
From Total Portfolio Activation to the 
Impact of Equity Engagement   
The IE2 initiative builds upon insights drawn 
from earlier work on “Total Portfolio Activation” 
(TPA), a framework for creating social and 
environmental impact across asset classes.  The 
TPA framework identified four related areas of 
activity where opportunities for impact could be 
pursued across all asset classes in a diversified 
portfolio: investment selection, active ownership, 
networks and coalitions, and policy activities. It 
also provided a structured process for identifying 
an investor’s impact opportunity set across asset 
classes and then re-allocating its investments to 
higher impact opportunities.  Figure 1, next page, 
highlights how a hypothetical investment 
portfolio could be analyzed and re-allocated 
using the TPA framework.  
Although Total Portfolio Activation provides an 
impact investing framework that explicitly 
extends across asset classes, the pursuit of impact 
is by no means the same in every asset class. 
Within each of several asset classes commonly 
found in a diversified portfolio, including cash 
and cash equivalents, fixed income, public and 
private equity, and real assets, we consequently 
analyzed the relative role of various activities in 
creating impact opportunities. In public equities, 
for example, we found that networked 
engagement through active shareownership and 
coalition building with stakeholders delivered 
more tangible impact than investment decision-
making in isolation, though all four areas of 
activity are certainly relevant. Case studies of 
investors such as the Oneida Trust, the 
The pursuit of impact is different 
in every asset class, from public 
and private equity to fixed 
income to real assets. 
 Dominican Sisters of Hope, Tides, and the Equity 
Foundation repeatedly reinforced this analysis.  
The IE2 initiative therefore builds upon this basic 
insight, providing an organized effort to explore 
more deeply and empirically the impact of 
engagement in the public equity asset class.   
During our consultation process, we also engaged 
with numerous public equity investors using 
thematic sustainability strategies, investing in 
clean technology, women’s empowerment, or 
workplace issues. These investors stressed the 
role of ESG research, analysis, and the ultimate 
buy, hold, and sell decisions as potentially high-
impact areas of activity. While a case can be made 
that investment decision-making can lead to 
positive impacts in the marketplace, the diffuse 
nature of ownership in the secondary markets 
makes the already challenging question of impact 
attribution even more difficult. We welcome the 
opportunity to work with others in the future to 
investigate more fully the impact of 
sustainability-themed public equity investing. For 
the time being, though, the IE2 initiative has 
focused on isolating factors that contribute to 
changes in corporate policies and practice in 
more readily observable forms: those that arise 
from engagement. 
Defining Shareholder Engagement 
According to the PRI, public equity engagement is 
“the process through which investors use their 
influence to encourage companies they invest in 
to improve their management of ESG issues.” 
Investors can use a number of different strategies 
to engage with companies; we have identified 
four broad forms of engagement: participation in 
the “proxy process” of filing shareholder 
resolutions and casting proxy votes, dialogue 
with companies, public policy initiatives, and 
more assertive actions. (See Figure 2, and for a 
full inventory, Appendix 1.) The tools 
shareholders use range from activities involving 
 
Figure 1. Total Portfolio Activation Map, Before and After 
         BEFORE TPA                                    AFTER TPA 
In the Total Portfolio Activation exercise, investors can transition their portfolio of investments across asset classes 
to better reflect their ESG impact priorities. This includes moving investment funds out of low-impact and negative 
impact public equity holdings, and into higher impact investments, including what is labeled here as Active ESG 
Engagement in Domestic Equity. Note: Circle size represents assets invested. 
Source: Humphreys, Solomon, and Electris, “Total Portfolio Activation. 
 relatively little effort on the part of the investor, 
such as signing onto a letter, to multi-year, 
multifaceted strategies involving initiating 
dialogues, writing reports, or organizing 
campaigns and initiatives.  
One of the most common types of engagement, 
particularly in the United States, is through the 
proxy process, which allows shareholders to 
engage with a company on its policies, 
operations, and transparency. There are two 
related forms of this type of engagement: 
shareholder resolution filing and proxy voting. A 
shareholder resolution is a proposal submitted to 
a company to be voted on by all shareholders at 
the annual shareholder meeting. Shareholder 
resolutions typically ask for positive changes in 
corporate ESG disclosure, policies, and practices. 
Corporate management also presents resolutions 
which often relate to the governance of the 
corporation, such as board composition, capital 
structure, and auditing. Shareholders then vote 
on resolutions through proxy voting. Investment 
advisers who exercise voting authority over their 
client proxies have a fiduciary duty, and are thus 
required by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), to adopt policies and 
procedures for voting proxies in their clients’ 
interests.3 Many of these organizations publish 
their proxy voting guidelines and disclose their 
voting record online. Shareholder resolutions and 
proxy voting are two of the most common 
activities that investors track as part of their 
engagement strategy, and are often used as part 
of a larger campaign to achieve maximum impact. 
A second form of engagement involves dialogue 
with companies. An investor can initiate a direct 
dialogue by meeting with one or more companies, 
either individually or in coordination with other 
investors or civil society. Dialogues, especially 
when combined with other types of engagement, 
can be particularly powerful in motivating a 
company to change its practices, as demonstrated 
in the case study on investor dialogue with 
Colgate-Palmolive on climate change (see case 
study, page 5).4  
Figure 2. Categories of Shareholder Engagement Activities 
• Engage with companies through shareholder resolutions and proxy voting on ESG issues.
Proxy Process
• Communicate directly or indirectly with a company to demand changes in practices that impact ESG issues.
Dialogue
• Attempt to influence governmental regulation to require companies to improve their ESG impacts.
Policy
• Take legal action or campaign to force or pressure a change in company behavior.
Assertive Action
 Dialogue also provides an opportunity for 
investors to engage with a company even if 
they do not hold shares, whether they exercise 
their 
 investor voice prior to purchasing shares or 
after selling shares and communicating their 
concerns to the company. 5  
A third major category involves engaging on 
policy issues. Investors have sought mandatory 
disclosure requirements on board diversity, 
political spending, executive pay, and conflict 
minerals, among other issues. Investors may 
also send comment letters on proposed rules 
and regulations, produce a benchmarking 
report, or help shape industry regulation to 
promote better ESG practices. 
Engaged investors have repeatedly used their 
unique voices to support political change led by 
civil society coalitions or legislators. For 
example, investor coalitions can weigh in on 
federal environmental policy that affect 
companies and sectors in which they invest, as 
when members of the Investor Network on 
Climate Risk (INCR), a project of Ceres, 
successfully pushed the US Congress for a 
short-term extension to the Production Tax 
Credit for wind energy in 2012.  
Similarly, in November 2011, Trillium Asset 
Management and Calvert Investments, along 
with 68 other employers, co-signed an amicus 
brief in support of Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management, a court case filed by Gay & 
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders to challenge 
section three of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which discriminated against same-sex 
couples seeking access to federal benefits such 
as Social Security. 
The investors’ amicus brief described the 
burdens that DOMA placed on businesses 
forced to treat their employees with same-sex  
 
Greenhouse gas emissions have been the topic of 
numerous shareholder engagements over the past 
several years, often leading to increased disclosure 
by companies of their emissions and other 
sustainability metrics. The CDP, formerly known as 
the Carbon Disclosure Project, has catalyzed many of 
these engagements. While disclosure is an important 
step toward sustainability, investors are increasingly 
asking companies to set emissions reduction 
targetsa specific percentage reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to a baseline 
year.  
In May 2014, Colgate-Palmolive announced its 
second generation climate goals. Colgate had already 
been actively addressing its environmental impact, 
analyzing its footprint and reducing energy use and 
carbon emissions for several years. CDP has 
recognized Colgate several times for its advanced 
work on carbon disclosure. In setting its new climate 
goals, Colgate engaged with several stakeholder 
groups and Walden Asset Management. Walden and 
the stakeholders advocated that Colgate consider 
setting greenhouse gas reduction goals rooted in 
climate science. After an extensive dialogue involving 
in-person meetings with experts, sharing of 
information, ideas, and challenges, Colgate set its 
new quantitative goals for reducing its emissions. 
They have committed to reducing carbon emissions 
on an absolute basis by 25 percent compared to 
2002 by 2020, and by 50 percent by 2050. These 
goals are in line with the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change and will help Colgate achieve its goal 
of limiting the effects of climate change.  
Companies frequently hesitate to acknowledge that 
an engagement with an investor was a motivator for 
shaping a new policy, making it challenging at times 
to attribute impact to specific engagements. 
However in this case, Colgate explicitly 
acknowledged the important influence of outside 
stakeholders in its annual sustainability report. 
Sustained dialogue by long-term investors can be a 
powerful tool to encourage a company to change its 
policies or practices. On-going dialogue will be 
needed to ensure that Colgate ultimately meets its 
emissions reduction commitments.  
 
 
   
 
 
A multi-stakeholder initiative consisting of SRI investors, NGOs, and the United Nations has been 
using a variety of public policy strategies to tackle the issue of forced and child labor in Uzbekistan. 
Every fall, the Uzbek government forces over a million citizens to work in the cotton fields, shutting 
down schools and public offices, and subjecting workers to quotas and police force, to ensure that the 
work gets done. The government had also barred international monitoring groups, including the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), from observing these activities; independent activists who 
have tried to monitor the practices have been detained and imprisoned. 
In 2008, As You Sow began a letter writing campaign with investors and other NGOs asking American 
publicly-traded companies if they knew where their cotton was being sourced from; this led to 
meetings with government officials, corporations, investors and NGOs at the State Department and 
the Gap. These actions, along with boycotts, resulted in the Uzbek government ratifying two ILO 
Conventions which would end the worst forms of child labor, although the government then 
proceeded to ignore these laws. 
On the policy side, Calvert Investments has been working with the State Department and Department 
of Labor on this topic, and has co-written press releases and participated in webinars and gatherings 
to draw attention to this issue. The firm is also a member of the Cotton Campaign, whose members 
include Boston Common Asset Management, Human Rights Watch, the International Labor Rights 
Forum, Responsible Sourcing Network, ILO, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the UN 
Human Rights Council. Together members have pressured the Uzbek government to work with the 
ILO and to begin to improve its practices. In June 2013, the Campaign wrote a letter to John Kerry, 
requesting  that the ILO be allowed to monitor within the country, and also asking that the US 
government remind companies operating in Uzbekistan to remember their due diligence 
responsibilities. 
Corporations and industry associations have largely been cooperative in this process, both by 
publicly voicing their opposition to forced labor and by participating in multi-stakeholder forums. 
However, the challenge has been to ensure that Uzbek cotton is not in their supply chains, since 
traceability is an issue. Still, more than 160 companies have signed the Cotton Pledge, committing to 
take actions to ensure that no forced labor is being used in their supply chain, and to “not knowingly 
source Uzbek cotton for the manufacturing of any of [their] products.” 
Although the situation is dire, it appears that some steps have been made by the Uzbek government. 
In 2013, it responded by allowing the ILO to monitor the fall harvest and by significantly reducing the 
number of children under the age of sixteen who are forced to pick cotton. This year, the government 
has said that no one under eighteen will be allowed to work; the ILO cited 49 cases of children under 
18 working in the cotton fields, down from 53 in 2013. However, forced labor by adults is continuing, 
with teachers, public employees, and other citizens struggling to meet the 3.3 million tons quota. In 
June 2014, Uzbekistan was placed in Tier 3 of the annual Trafficking in Persons Report due to its 
egregious labor violations; this classification is reserved for governments who refuse to take the 
minimal steps to combat human trafficking, and carries the potential for sanctions. 
 
The international campaign against forced labor in Uzbek cotton fields provides a case study of 
industry, investors, and NGOs working to fight human rights violations. It also exemplifies the 
challenges around using corporate engagement to change government policy.  
 
 spouses disadvantageously from other 
married workers.6 Two years later, the 
US Supreme Court ruled that DOMA’s 
third section was indeed 
unconstitutional. Although the investors’ 
amicus brief was only one part of a much 
larger social and political movement that 
pushed the federal government to 
recognize same-sex marriages, it 
exemplifies how investors can contribute 
their voice to a chorus of coalitions in 
civil society. 
Three additional examples of multi-
stakeholder policy campaigns can be 
found in this report. The first details the 
struggle to tackle forced and child labor 
issues in the Uzbek cotton industry (page 
6).7 The second details issues 
surrounding palm oil (page 28). The 
third discusses the campaign to 
incorporate a shareholder advisory vote 
on executive compensation for public 
companies into the 2010 Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (page 29).8 
Lastly, investors can take what we term 
“assertive action” to press for change in 
corporate practices, including litigation, 
pursuing a seat on the Board of Directors, 
or leading or becoming involved in 
divestment or public press campaigns. 
The case study on women’s 
representation on boards (across) 
provides one example of a public 
campaign for diversity in corporate 
governance.9 
Divestment is a more controversial tactic 
which may be used as part of a broader 
toolkit of engagement activities. One of 
the most well- known examples is the 
divestment campaign against South 
 
 
Pax World Investments and Calvert Investments have 
employed multiple tools in their advocacy to encourage 
women’s representation in corporate leadership among public 
companies. While both firms have engaged on issues of board 
diversity through filing shareholder resolutions and dialogues, 
this case study highlights the combined power of Pax’s use of 
“assertive action”—a public campaign—and Calvert’s 
development of reporting metrics to address gender inequality 
in the corporate world. 
In 2004, Calvert partnered with the United National 
Development Fund for Women to launch the Calvert Women’s 
Principles, a code of conduct which provides companies with 
indicators to assess their performance around issues of gender 
equality, including the appointment of women to management 
and board positions. Together with Pax and the UNPRI, Calvert 
has also encouraged companies to endorse the UN-developed 
Women’s Empowerment Principles (WEP), a successor to the 
Calvert Women’s Principles, which now have over 815 
signatories to the CEO Statement of Support.  
In 2010, the same year that the WEP was launched, Pax began 
the Say No to All Male Boards Campaign, encouraging investors 
to vote “no” on all-male board of director slates. Working with a 
coalition of other money managers and institutional investors, 
Pax developed letters and sample proxy voting guidelines for 
individual and institutional investors to send to companies with 
no women, or fewer than two women, on the board slate. As 
part of the campaign, Pax CEO Joe Keefe published an op-ed 
with Jackie Zehner in the Huffington Post in 2011 entitled 
“Saying ‘No’ to All-Male Corporate Boards.” In the op-ed, Keefe 
and Zehner advocate that individual as well as institutional 
investors “withhold support for all-male director slates, or 
instruct whoever is voting our proxies to withhold such 
support”—to vote “no” on board slates that fail to include at 
least one woman.  
Through a combination of these individual measures, these 
firms have been able to demonstrate their impact. Since 2010, 
Pax World has withheld support from over 800 slates of board 
nominees due to insufficient gender diversity. Pax World 
registers its concerns with companies through a follow-up 
letter explaining the reason for its opposition and urges them to 
embrace gender diversity on their board. Following Calvert’s 
proposals on board diversity, forty-two women have been 
added to corporate boards. Additionally, according to Calvert’s 
Examining the Cracks in the Ceiling report, the number of S&P 
100 companies with three or more women or minorities on the 
board of directors increased from 67 in 2010 to 71 in 2012, and 
30 companies added at least one woman director during the 
same time period.  
 Africa’s Apartheid government in the 1970s-90s. 
Churches and students began pressuring US 
companies with operations in South Africa in the 
1960s and ‘70s, as race riots, boycotts, and 
protests in South Africa increased. Socially 
responsible investors and public pension funds 
joined the calls for action, requesting in part that 
companies sign onto the Sullivan Principles, 
which called on companies to adopt “racially 
neutral policies in South African operations.”10 In 
the 1980s, the US government began pushing a 
series of boycotts, embargoes and sanctions 
against the government of South Africa, 
culminating in the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act in 1986, which banned new 
investment in South Africa. By the end of 1988, 
more than 150 universities had at least partially 
divested, over 200 US companies had left South 
Africa, US direct investment had declined from 
$2.3 billion in 1982 to $1.3 billion, the value of 
the South African currency had decreased 
significantly, and inflation was in the double 
digits.11 
Some researchers have questioned the level of 
impact that divestment campaigns truly had on 
the South African government, noting that 
divestment did not affect South African financial 
markets.12 Yet the South African divestment 
campaign was not aimed at generating narrow 
financial impacts; instead, its objective was to 
increase public awareness of Apartheid, 
stigmatizing companies that partnered with the 
Apartheid government.13 While the impact of this 
type of investor engagement may be difficult to 
measure, this particular divestment campaign 
clearly affected corporate behavior at the time. It 
also provided a model for future investor 
engagements around issues such as fair hiring in 
Northern Ireland, public health concerns related 
to tobacco, the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, and 
today’s divestment campaigns against companies 
involved in fossil-fuel extraction or profiting from 
Israeli human rights violations in the Palestinian 
territories.  Although some observers view 
divestment as antithetical to engagement, many 
investors see it as an escalated step in a longer 
campaign of engagement. (See the case study of 
the Presbyterian Church’s decision to divest from 
companies where dialogue proved unproductive, 
on page 20.) Divesting from a company need not 
mean that an investor abandons opportunities to 
engage with it. Indeed, as highlighted in the case 
of the Equity Foundation in “Total Portfolio 
Activation,” investors continued to dialogue with 
Target over its corporate giving to anti-gay 
groups even after they had sold their shares in 
the company. Once Target ultimately changed its 
policy, it returned to the investors’ buy list.  
Additionally, the ongoing campaign for 
divestment from fossil fuel companies, which has 
grown rapidly in the past four years, provides an 
example of how divestment can work within 
broader shareholder engagement campaigns to 
move an industry. Though started primarily by 
student organizers focused on university 
endowments, the campaign has grown to 
encompass faith institutions, foundations, cities 
and states, other non-profit endowments, and 
individual investors. Although some 
environmental activists see divestment as an 
alternative to engagement, many investors see 
fossil-fuel divestment as one piece of a broader 
strategy to confront climate change. As the 
Carbon Tracker Initiative recently put it, “true 
engagement needs the pressure created by 
divestment. Engagement without divestment is 
like a criminal legal system without a police 
force.”14 The fossil fuel industry is taking note and 
going on the defensive, suggesting that they see 
the campaign for fossil-fuel divestment as a major 
threat to their businesses.15  
Structure of the Report 
The next section, Investor Engagement as a 
Strategy for Social and Environmental Impact, 
 presents the initial findings of the IE2 initiative 
drawn from consultation interviews as well as 
primary and secondary source research. It 
reviews the history of shareholder advocacy for 
positive social, environmental, and governance 
outcomes, and the work that has been done to 
study the impact of public equity engagement. 
Based on this research, we argue that two 
features of investor engagement with publicly 
traded companies appear to generate the highest 
impacts: 1) collaboration and coordination with 
stakeholders in civil society and 2) escalation and 
sustained engagement over time.   
The following section, A New Reporting 
Framework for Equity Engagement, reviews 
existing approaches to tracking shareholder 
advocacy and highlights their limitations for 
impact analysis. We then present a new reporting 
framework for investors to track the progress of 
their engagements and to analyze their potential 
for impact. The IE2 Reporting Framework’s 
design responds to our research findings.  It takes 
into account the full range of engagement 
opportunities across the taxonomy we have 
created and it helps investors to isolate key 
features of their engagements in order to see 
more clearly the ingredients of their impact. 
Sidebars throughout this report highlight recent 
case studies, which exemplify a range of different 
types of engagements, on a variety of 
environmental, social, and corporate governance 
issues. These case studies are meant to 
demonstrate examples of engagements that 
would be included in the IE2 Reporting 
Framework, and also serve to demonstrate the 
potential that engagements have to create change 
within companies and to create tangible impacts 
for employees, stakeholders, communities, and 
the ecosystems affected by corporate policies and 
practices. 
Proxy Process
•Proxy voting
•Shareholder resolution filing
Dialogue
•Direct dialogue with companies
•Catalyze dialogue between company and another stakeholder
•Participate in multi-stakeholder initiative
•Take collective action with other investors
•Coordinate with civil society
•Exercise investor voice
Policy
•Send comment letters and engage on SEC rules/regulations and other relevant regulatory 
proposals
•Ask companies to be a public voice for a policy
•Submit public testimony
•Submit Amicus briefs
•Produce reports identifying best practices/benchmarking for policymakers
•Encourage regulatory bodies to codify best ESG practices, and to set up metrics and measure
•Help shape industry regulation to promote better ESG practices
•Write public policy opinion editorials and reports
Assertive 
Action
•Legal action 
•Pursue a seat on the board
•Use public press campaigns
•Participate in organized divestment campaigns
•Organize divestment campaigns
Figure 3. Taxonomy of Engagement Activities 
* See Appendix 1 for a more detailed breakdown of the taxonomy, particularly for proxy voting and shareholder resolution filing. 
  
irst used as a tool of social movement 
activists, shareholder engagement grew to 
prominence in the United States in the 
middle of the 20th century. Although it has been 
taken up by many investors as one of many tools 
of sustainable and responsible investing, some 
argue that shareholder engagement remains 
most impactful when situated within grassroots 
movements and stakeholder-led corporate 
campaigns.16 
Prior to the 1970s, through a process approved 
and overseen by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, shareholder resolutions and proxy 
votes were traditionally used to address 
corporate governance matters. Yet in the spring 
of 1970, civil society organizations for the first 
time recognized, and acted on, the idea that 
public corporations could be held accountable to 
their shareholders for environmental and social 
policies. Environmental and anti-Vietnam War 
activists flooded the shareholder meetings of 
Commonwealth Edison and BankAmerica 
Corporation, among others, speaking directly to 
company executives against their corporate 
policies. The same season, a consumer advocacy 
group called the Campaign to Make General 
Motors Responsible, led by public interest  
 
lawyers and referred to as Campaign GM, 
proposed nine shareholder resolutions to GM.17 
Campaign GM relied on the twelve shares of GM 
stock owned by a partner nonprofit to file the 
resolutions.18 
Although the SEC ruled that only two of the nine 
shareholder resolutions were required to be 
included in the management proxy statement—
and although each of the two received fewer than 
three percent of the votes cast—Campaign GM 
attracted national media attention to the lack of 
diversity on GM’s corporate board, and the 
company’s resistance to automobile safety and 
air pollution legislation. According to Donald 
Schwartz, Campaign GM opened up questions 
about “what issues can be submitted to 
shareholders, the role of the modern corporation 
in society, what is required of our institutional 
investors.”19 It also brought about a new era of 
advocacy, as more campaigns took advantage of 
the proxy process to put pressure on public 
corporations. 
Through the 1970s, activists used shareholder 
engagement as a tool to influence corporate 
behavior on matters as varied as labor rights, 
product safety, and environmental conservation. 
Their campaigns demonstrated that shareholder 
engagement can have real impact. In 1976, led by 
F 
 the vision of union staffer Ray Rogers, the 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (ACTWU) launched a campaign against the 
massive anti-union textile manufacturer J.P. 
Stevens. 20 Deciding that traditional labor tactics 
like boycotts and strikes wouldn’t be effective 
against J.P. Stevens, Rogers decided to target the 
corporation’s 1977 shareholder meeting.  
Hundreds of union supporters used stock proxies 
to crowd inside the annual shareholders meeting, 
and 4,000 more protested outside.21 Rogers 
continued to use shareholder power to oust two 
anti-union members of the J.P. Stevens board of 
directors, eventually gaining a collective 
bargaining agreement for more than 3,000 
workers at ten textile factories in the South. The 
ACTWU’s fight against J.P. Stevens—often 
considered the first true “corporate campaign”—
demonstrated that shareholder processes could 
be used as an effective tool for workers 
organizing against an anti-union employer. 
Shareholder Engagement as an 
Effective Tool for Corporate 
Accountability  
Although they called on institutional investors for 
their proxy votes, the early activists using 
shareholder advocacy to advance social and 
environmental goals were not themselves 
investors. Investor networks including the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR) and the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center grew out of these social movements to 
focus investor attention on the power of 
shareholder engagement around social and 
environmental issues. More recently, with the 
rise of sustainable and responsible investing, an 
increasing number of asset managers and asset 
owners have begun adopting the tools of 
shareholder engagement for environmental and 
social issues, as well as corporate governance 
concerns. As the US SIF Foundation’s 2012 Report 
on Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in 
the United States notes, “A few decades ago, the 
prevailing view among large investors was that 
they should support the position of portfolio 
company management, and that if they actually 
felt moved to vote against management, they 
should consider selling their shares. This view 
has evolved over time.”22 
Indeed, over the past two decades, engaged 
investors have had significant impacts on 
environmental, social, and corporate governance 
practices—not only of individual companies, but 
also of entire industries and sectors. We explore 
four examples below where coalitions of 
investors have positively impacted industry 
practices on environmental and labor standards 
of apparel supply chain sourcing, on non-
discrimination policies inclusive of LGBTQ 
(lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer) workers, 
on toxins with implications for environmental 
health, and on conflict minerals. These examples 
highlight engagement strategies used across our 
taxonomy, and many involve combining multiple 
activities from the proxy process, dialogue, policy, 
and assertive action, as part of broader 
campaigns seeking changes in multiple 
companies, within an industry, and across 
sectors. 
 
Engaged investors have had 
significant impacts on 
environmental, social, and 
corporate governance practices—
not only of individual companies, 
but also of entire industries and 
sectors. 
 Apparel Supply Chain 
For over 30 years, investors have engaged with 
their portfolio companies around supply chain 
issues—ranging from labor conditions for 
workers at apparel and electronics factories to 
environmental sustainability of agricultural 
industry sourcing. Starting in the 1990s, 
investors played a key role in campaigns to push 
large apparel retailers including Nike, Gap, and 
Adidas to address working conditions at 
sweatshop factories in their supply chains and to 
encourage greater worker empowerment in 
workplaces.23 
Starting in the early 1990s, investigative 
journalists published a number of exposés 
designed to highlight abhorrent working 
conditions at factories producing garments for 
large American apparel brands.24 Investors and 
investor networks including US SIF (formerly the 
Social Investment Forum) and ICCR worked in 
coalition with unions and civil society groups in 
countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Lesotho, 
as well as the United States.25 Shareholders used 
annual shareholder meetings as forums to 
interrogate executives of Nike, Gap, Disney, 
Walmart, and Kohls about the labor conditions in 
their supply chain factories.26 Investors 
submitted a number of shareholder resolutions 
asking for corporate social responsibility reports 
on labor conditions and asking for commitments 
to improve working conditions.27 These efforts 
led to public commitments by many of these 
companies to require manufacturer codes of 
conduct around labor issues, marking a 
significant change in the globalized garment 
industry. 
These commitments have not marked the end of 
investor action around supply-chain 
sustainability.28 Faith-based investors, in 
particular, have begun to focus on slavery and 
human trafficking in public companies’ supply 
chains.29 In June 2014, the European Social 
Investment Forum (Eurosif) published a report 
on the continued importance to investors of 
inquiry into supply chain and procurement 
sustainability of public companies.30 Additionally, 
investors continue to join in coalition with civil 
society and worker-led organizations to address 
workers’ rights in supply chains. (For more on 
these ongoing engagements, see the case study on 
the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, page 14, and 
the Bangladesh Fire and Building Safety accord, 
page 22).31 
Non-Discrimination Policies Inclusive of LGBTQ 
Workers 
Another place where investor engagement has 
led to impact in a number of publicly listed 
companies across sectors is the expansion of 
corporate equal employment opportunity policies 
to include LGBTQ employees. Dialogue and 
shareholder proposals have focused on 
nondiscrimination policies based on sexual 
orientation, or more recently, on gender identity 
and expression. This campaign began in 1993, 
when the New York City Employees Retirement 
System filed a shareholder proposal requesting 
that Cracker Barrel address sexual orientation 
discrimination. The pension fund continued to re-
file annually until 2003, when the resolution 
received 58-percent support and Cracker Barrel 
finally agreed to amend its policy. According to 
the US SIF Foundation’s 2003 Report on 
Sustainable and Responsible Investing Trends in 
the United States, “this resolution is the first social 
issue proposal opposed by management in US 
shareholder history to receive majority 
support.”32  
Since this initial proposal, engaged investors have 
filed more than 200 nondiscrimination 
resolutions, leading to changes at more than 175 
companies. Moreover, as Shelley Alpern, the 
Director of Social Research and Advocacy at Clean 
Yield Asset Management, has noted, “both 
anecdotal and documented evidence indicates 
 that additional companies have changed their 
policies simply in response to inquiries from 
shareholders.”33 In fact, corporate America has 
acted much faster than state governments: 91 
percent of Fortune 500 companies now provide 
protections based on sexual orientation, 
compared with 21 states and the District of 
Columbia. In 2002, three years before 
shareholders began extending their resolutions 
to include protections around “gender identity 
and expression,” only three percent of Fortune 
500 companies had nondiscrimination policies 
around this issue. Today, that percentage has 
risen to 61 percent, while only 17 states and the 
District of Columbia offer the same protections.34 
 
Toxic Chemicals in the Marketplace 
The Investor Environmental Health Network 
(IEHN), a group of investors working in 
collaboration with environmental NGOs, played 
an important role in pressuring numerous public 
corporations to change practices around 
industrial chemical use between 2005 and 2007. 
Focusing on public companies with large “toxic 
footprints”—including those producing products 
that contained toxic chemicals, like lead, mercury, 
and potential carcinogens—the investor 
members of IEHN utilized shareholder 
resolutions, letters to companies, proxy voting  
Members of the Coalition of Immokalee Workers and their consumer allies protest outside of Wendy's annual shareholder meeting in May 
2014. Photo credit Coalition of Immokalee Workers. 
 
   
 
 
Since 2001, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), a worker-based human rights organization in 
Immokalee, Florida that is internationally recognized for its achievements in the fields of corporate social 
responsibility, community organizing, and countering human trafficking, and consumers nationwide have 
waged the Campaign for Fair Food (CFF) to improve working conditions and wages for tomato pickers in 
Florida and beyond. The Campaign asks large tomato purchasers—including fast food companies, food 
service corporations, and supermarket chains—to sign on to the Fair Food Program. The Fair Food Program, 
a unique farmworker- and consumer-driven initiative, consists of a wage increase supported by a price 
premium paid by corporate purchasers of Florida tomatoes, and a human-rights-based Code of Conduct, 
applicable throughout the Florida tomato industry. 
The CFF began with a four-year boycott against Taco Bell (owned by Yum! Brands) in April 2001. Since then, 
the CIW has joined with faith leaders, students, and allies to bring twelve companies into the Fair Food 
Program. The CIW and its consumer allies have employed diverse tactics, including direct actions such as 
fasts, picket lines, and marches. However, a key part of their organizing has included a focus on the 
shareholder meetings of the public companies they target. 
Investors including Walden Asset Management, Trillium Asset Management, and members of the ICCR have 
filed resolutions asking for companies to report on labor conditions in their supply chain, to adopt ILO 
standards, or to sign on to the Fair Food Program. According to Noelle Damico, a senior fellow at the National 
Economic and Social Rights Initiative who has worked with the CIW for over 10 years, “Since 2003, as 
investors have lodged various shareholder resolutions, we have always paired them with two things: we 
have people inside from the CIW and its consumer allies speaking directly to investors, [and] a public action 
outside, or nearby, the shareholder meeting.” 
Union pension funds and religious organizations are among investors who have signed over proxies to CIW 
and allies to enable them to address executives and shareholders at companies' annual meetings. According 
to Damico, “It’s an opportunity for farmworkers at the bottom of the supply chain to speak to people at the 
top and for shareholders to hear from consumers.”  
This shareholder work has been successful. The Yum! Brands Resolution garnered over 30 percent of 
shareholder votes in 2003 and 2004 and led to direct responses by company executives to the workers’ asks: 
for example, at the 2004 Yum! Brands shareholder meeting, CEO David Novak told a representative of the 
CIW that they had a “willingness to work toward solutions” to ending the CIW Taco Bell boycott. One year 
later, following further increase in consumer action throughout the year, Taco Bell signed a Fair Food 
Agreement, and two years after that, Yum! Brands announced at its shareholders meeting that it would 
extend the Fair Food Agreement to five of its other brands, including KFC and Pizza Hut. 
Investors have worked closely with the CIW to support their campaigns—and this collaboration has effected 
true impact on the ground. According to Damico, “What’s key is that our partners in the investor community 
work hand in hand with the workers themselves so that the resolution that’s put together is on target for 
moving the campaign forward... First you have to find out, does the CIW want a shareholder resolution? Is it 
strategic?  What other investor actions could be helpful?” By utilizing shareholder tactics where they are 
most strategic in a worker-led campaign, institutional investors and money managers have been able to 
achieve true impact.  
Currently, the Campaign for Fair Food is targeting Wendy’s and Kroger. Shareholder resolutions and actions 
at public companies’ annual general meetings continue to be an important tactic for the CIW.  Twelve 
companies have signed on to the Fair Food Program, which has dramatically improved wages and working 
conditions for tens of thousands of farmworkers in Florida.  
 guidelines, and public policy advocacy around 
safer corporate chemical policies. 
In particular, during the 2005, 2006, and 2007 
proxy seasons, members of the IEHN filed 43 
resolutions at 27 public companies.35 They 
received commitments for new initiatives on 
reducing toxic chemicals in products or 
packaging from companies including Whole 
Foods, Walmart, ConAgra, Becton Dickinson, 
Sears Holdings, Apple, and Johnson & Johnson.36 
As Jonas Kron wrote in a 2007 report, “While 
generally citing various reasons for adopting 
more health-protective policies (often including 
consumer pressure), companies who acted after 
the 2006 proxy seasons often acknowledged the 
role of shareholder dialogue in advancing toxic 
issues to the forefront of management’s 
attention.”37 Today, IEHN has expanded its work 
on toxic chemicals to focus more deeply on the 
environmental health implications of hydraulic 
fracturing for natural gas and oil. 
Conflict in Mineral Supply Chains 
More recently, investor action on extractive 
industries in conflict zones has produced 
important changes in how companies involved in 
mining do business. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(known as “Dodd-Frank”) included a provision 
that requires publicly traded companies to prove, 
through reports or audits, that they are not 
purchasing minerals from sources that are 
helping to fund regional conflicts, such as in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2009-2010, 
prior to Dodd-Frank, numerous investors 
engaged directly with companies on the topic of 
conflict minerals, as Canon acknowledged in its 
2012 sustainability report. However, following 
the passage of this law, investors began 
submitting comments to the SEC regarding the 
rule-making process around this issue. To 
demonstrate support for the law, a multi-
stakeholder initiative that included investors, 
NGOs, and Fortune 500 companies such as Ford, 
AMD, and Dell sent four letters to the SEC 
recommending “transparency and accountability 
in mineral supply chains.”38 The final ruling was 
issued in August 2012, passing 3-2; however, in 
October the Chamber of Commerce brought a suit 
against the Commission which challenged the 
ruling.39 In response, an investor letter with 
nearly 50 signatures was sent to the SEC asking 
the Commission to enact the new regulations 
“without delay,” and in July 2013, the ruling was 
upheld.40 According to PwC, over half of all SEC 
issuers will be affected by this ruling, and private 
companies are likely to follow the standard as 
well.41  Investors consequently played a key role 
in helping to diminish the role that extractive 
industries and the mineral trade may play in 
stoking regional conflict and instability in war-
torn regions like central Africa. 
Over the last thirty years, engaged investors have 
entered into thousands of engagements like these 
with public companies around environmental, 
social, and governance issues.  In the process, 
they have obtained hundreds of verbal or written 
commitments to improve practices that directly 
affect people and places that fall within 
companies’ footprints. Although it can be 
challenging to attribute the impact of shareholder 
engagement in precise, measurable ways, these 
examples nonetheless highlight how concerted 
investor actions around issues such as supply 
chain sourcing and labor conditions, non-
discrimination against LGBTQ employees, toxic 
chemicals, and conflict mineral sourcing have had 
significant and identifiable impacts across sectors 
and industries. 
Tracking Shareholder Engagement 
Shareholder resolutions and proxy voting remain 
some of the most visible ways in which 
institutional investors and asset managers 
 participate in shareholder engagement. Because 
of their discrete nature and the increasing public 
data now available on the proxy process, 
shareholder resolutions can readily be tracked 
and quantified. Indeed, several groups, such as As 
You Sow, FundVotes.com, ICCR, IEHN, INCR, 
MSCI’s Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
Sustainable Investments Institute, and the US SIF 
Foundation, as well as other proxy advisory 
firms, provide regular reports on the scale and 
scope of shareholder activity in the proxy 
process. 
For over 15 years, the US SIF Foundation, the 
nonprofit research arm of the Forum for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment, has 
tracked broad trends in shareholder advocacy 
around environmental and social issues. Over 
time, US SIF Foundation’s biennial “SRI Trends 
Report” has expanded the scope of its research 
around shareholder advocacy to include the 
leading types of shareholder proposals and 
proponents.  It also includes case studies and 
examples of successful environmental, social, and 
governance-related resolutions. The quantitative 
data measure straightforward, visible outputs of 
the process, such as the numbers of proponents 
and their assets under management and the 
number of resolutions, their withdrawal rates, 
and the average votes they received. Although the 
case studies provide exemplary success stories, 
the proxy trends data do not ultimately reflect 
whether any changes or impacts occurred as a 
result of the proxy process.  
Since the release of its 2004 paper “Unlocking the 
Power of the Proxy,” As You Sow, in collaboration 
with groups such as Rockefeller Philanthropy 
Advisors, the Sustainable Investment Institute 
(SI2), and ProxyImpact, has published a valuable 
annual Proxy Preview that details each of the 
social and environmental shareholder resolutions 
filed each proxy season, giving shareholders 
important background information, historical 
context, and resources to help investors to cast 
their proxies in support of ESG resolutions.42   
Many investor networks provide more focused 
data on their members’ engagement activities. 
ICCR, an investor network of faith-based 
investors and a leading resource for shareholder 
proponents around social and environmental 
issues, maintains an online database of its 
membership’s current shareholder resolutions, 
informed by its own model of investor 
engagement.43 Ceres, which organizes the 
Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), 
similarly tracks resolutions filed by INCR 
members on sustainability or climate-related 
issues.44 IEHN regularly reports on the outcomes 
of its members’ resolutions on toxins and 
environmental health concerns. 
One of the most analytical efforts to evaluate 
investors’ proxy voting is provided by 
ProxyDemocracy.org.  The site compiles publicly 
available data on shareholder resolutions and 
proxy votes, primarily by mutual funds, as well as 
privately reported data from a selection of 
engaged investors. It also calculates an “activism 
footprint” for investors based on the proportion 
of their proxy votes cast against management’s 
recommendation, measured along four axes of 
issues that commonly arise on the proxy ballot: 
director elections, executive compensation, 
corporate governance, and corporate impact 
(which includes most social and environmental 
resolutions).  
Shareholder resolutions, and proxy voting on 
resolutions, certainly provide an important 
method of shareholder engagement around 
environmental, social, and governance issues. As 
You Sow’s Conrad MacKerron has highlighted 
that “most companies strive to maintain good 
relations with their investors, because minority 
or even minimal votes can often influence a 
company.”45 He goes on to write that “achieving a 
 majority vote is still rarely a realistic goal in this 
category. But the higher the vote count, the more 
pressure is placed on management to resolve a 
particular issue. While a vote of 8% to 12% on a 
social issue may seem to be small, it is often 
sufficient to bring about real change.”46 In a 2012 
paper, Ceres reported, “Over the past three years, 
230 sustainability-focused resolutions were filed 
by investors in Ceres’ network… Nearly half, or 
110 resolutions, were withdrawn by investors 
after the companies agreed to address their 
issues of concern.”47  
The proxy process alone, however, may not 
deliver the impact that engaged investors often 
seek. In his 2005 book The Challenge to Power: 
Money, Investing and Democracy, activist and 
socially responsible fund manager John 
Harrington noted, “No matter how good the 
personal relationship is between shareholders 
(individual or institutional) and corporate 
management’s representatives, the fact remains 
that resolutions are advisory only and mostly 
ignored by management.”48  Even winning a 
majority of shareholder proposal may not 
necessarily translate into a change in corporate 
policies by itself because the resolutions are not 
legally binding on the company. And for publicly 
traded companies domiciled outside of the US 
regulatory framework, the proxy process is often 
an even weaker process for shareholder input. 
Increasingly, shareholder proponents therefore 
engage in substantial dialogue with the company. 
Some do this before their resolutions go to a vote 
and withdraw the resolution upon reaching an 
agreement. One interviewee told us that 
“companies have become more interested in 
engagement instead of fighting resolutions on 
their ballot every year,” and thus are willing to 
have conversations with shareholders about 
social and environmental issues. Often the 
prospect of a shareholder resolution can convince 
a company to engage in dialogue with an investor 
around ESG issues in order to avoid the public 
scrutiny that accompanies the proxy ballot. 
Investors may find that initiating or filing a 
resolution may result in engagement through 
dialogue with a company which was not willing to 
dialogue prior to the threat of the resolution.  
Other investors dialogue routinely without 
turning to the proxy process.  Although dialogues 
are an important way in which investors pursue 
impact, the details of these dialogues—including 
who attended them, what commitments were 
secured, and what follow-up was done—are 
rarely tracked alongside data on shareholder 
resolutions. Indeed, many are subject to 
confidentiality agreements between investors 
and the companies, making their impacts even 
more difficult to assess.  
What Factors Make for Impactful 
Shareholder Engagement? 
In 2004, Steve Waygood wrote that unlike the 
extensive literature on the effective nature of 
investor activism around corporate governance, 
“there is not yet a body of academic literature 
analyzing whether Investor Advocacy Influence 
on the corporate responsibility agenda can be 
effective.”49 Yet in the past ten years, a growing 
literature found in academic, civil society, and 
industry publications has begun to investigate the 
impact of investor engagement on corporate ESG 
performance. There is certainly no certified 
“What’s key is that our partners in 
the investor community work hand 
in hand with the workers 
themselves so that the resolution 
that’s put together is on target for 
moving the campaign forward.” 
 recipe for impactful shareholder engagement. Yet 
existing literature and historical case studies 
suggest some of the most significant factors in 
ensuring that an investor involved in shareholder 
advocacy will have a social or environmental 
impact. In particular, impactful engagement 
seems to be characterized by 1) collaboration, 
not only with other investors but also with 
grassroots campaigns and civil society 
stakeholders; and 2) escalation, or deepening 
engagement over time. 
The analysis of what makes engagement 
impactful requires additional study, including 
data of the sort that anonymized reports via the 
IE2 Reporting Framework could provide. 
However, the literature seems to agree that 
largely qualitative factors like collaboration and 
escalation play an important part in impactful 
engagement. This literature is important to our 
study, because other existing reporting 
mechanisms do not account for these aspects of 
shareholder engagement. 
For their paper on “Active Ownership,” the 
recipients of the 2012 Moskowitz Prize for 
research in Socially Responsible Investing 
awarded by the Berkeley-Haas Center for 
Responsible Business, Elroy Dimson, Oguzhan 
Karakas, and Xi Li performed quantitative 
analysis on a data set of shareholder 
engagements made by a large institutional 
investor around environmental, social, and 
governance issues over a ten-year period.50 They 
conclude that shareholder engagement on issues 
of corporate social responsibility—including 
social and environmental issues, and issues of 
corporate governance—is most effective when 
conducted in collaboration with other investors 
and stakeholders, and when it involved repeated 
instances of engagement with the same 
company.51 Dimson, Karakas, and Li classify 
collaborations as “hard collaboration”—
conducted in partnership with other asset 
owners, civil society organizations, and 
individuals—and “soft collaborations”—in which 
the investor benefits passively from other 
investor initiatives. They find “cooperating with 
hard collaborators leads to higher success rate 
than with soft collaborators,” and that 
engagements that involve collaboration, repeated 
engagement, and focus on one particular issue 
are statistically more likely to be successful than 
other engagements. In particular, engaged 
investors often escalate, or deepen their 
engagement with a company over time. 52 The 
case study on “Assertive Action for Human Rights 
in Israel/Palestine” describes the Presbyterian 
Church (USA)’s deepening engagement process 
with Caterpillar over its involvement in human 
rights violations, starting with collaborative 
letters, escalating to shareholder resolutions and 
dialogues, and culminating in divestment (page 
20). 53 
It is important to note the strength of 
collaboration in shareholder engagement. This 
can include collaboration between multiple 
shareholders—for example, investor networks 
like INCR, IEHN, ICCR, and the PRI organize like-
minded investors to take collective action on ESG 
issues. Others have suggested that successful 
shareholder advocacy is also often characterized 
by collaboration with non-investor actors. A 2013 
paper by US SIF on the impact of sustainable and 
responsible investing notes, “Investors can 
influence companies and hold them to account for 
the labor and human rights violations, 
Shareholder engagement on issues 
of corporate social responsibility is 
most effective when conducted in 
collaboration with other investors 
and stakeholders. 
 
 
 environmental degradation, and other negative 
impacts that communities might experience due 
to company operations,” especially when 
collaborating with community and worker 
organizations.54 That paper briefly highlights the 
involvement of investors in civil society coalitions 
that have supported the campaign of the Coalition 
of Immokalee Workers. The case study on the 
Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Campaign for 
Fair Food further explores how investors have 
worked in coalition with workers and consumers 
to impact the quality of life of tomato pickers in 
Immokalee, Florida (page 14). 
Based on case studies on shareholder 
engagement by three money managers, Calvert, 
Insight, and Hermes, James Gifford conducted a 
qualitative investigation of “which factors 
contribute to shareholder influence in improving 
the environmental, social and corporate 
governance (ESG) performance of investee 
companies.”55 He concluded that coalition 
building was one of the most important factors in 
shareholder engagement, followed by the values 
of managers, strong business case, intensity of 
reputation, and actions that affect the reputation 
of companies.56  
Gifford writes that collaborations with 
stakeholders like NGOs and labor unions “can be 
an effective way of increasing the normative 
power, societal legitimacy and urgency of an 
investor request.” While the investor can put a 
unique type of pressure on a company to improve 
corporate practices or policies, Gifford notes, 
other stakeholders can engage in activities  
Tim Smith of Walden Asset Management speaks at a rally demanding the SEC mandate disclosure of political spending. 
Photo credit Antonia Peronace, ApolloPolitical.com. 
 
   
 
A number of religious investors, including the Presbyterian Church (USA), United Methodist Church, 
and Roman Catholic organizations, have engaged with companies on their involvement in military 
occupation in Israel/Palestine. In particular, these investors expressed concerns with Caterpillar, an 
American company that contracts with the Israeli military to provide heavy equipment used in home 
demolitions and the construction of settlements that have been declared illegal under international 
law. 
After over a decade of escalating engagement, the Presbyterian Church (USA) decided to divest its 
funds from three companies where they deemed engagement unproductive. This case study 
demonstrates how public divestment can be used as a tool of assertive action in a long-term 
engagement strategy. 
The PC(USA) started to focus on Caterpillar after an Israeli Caterpillar-brand armored bulldozer ran 
over and killed an American named Rachel Corrie in Gaza as she was standing with other peace 
activists in opposition to demolitions of Palestinian homes. In 2007, PC(USA)’s Committee on Mission 
Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI) joined other religious investors in filing a shareholder 
resolution for consideration at the 2008 Caterpillar meeting requesting that the Board of Directors 
review the company’s human rights policies, with respect to its involvement in violence in occupied 
territory. The investors withdrew the resolution in exchange for a dialogue, which multiple 
participants deemed unproductive: Caterpillar refused to take any responsibility for its equipment 
being used in human rights violations. 
At the 2010 shareholder meeting, another resolution asking Caterpillar to make its human rights 
policy align with international humanitarian law garnered 24.9 percent of the proxy vote. Following 
this, the PC(USA) cosigned a letter with eight other religious investors to the Chairman; a year later, it 
sent its own letter to the new CEO and resubmitted the previous letter. None of these inquiries 
received a response. Religious investors continued to sponsor shareholder resolutions asking 
Caterpillar to revisit its human rights policies, receiving over 25 percent support each year. In 
response, on April 22, 2013, Caterpillar wrote to PC(USA) and other investors that Caterpillar found no 
need to revise its company’s policy. This work was supported by civil society organizations in 
Israel/Palestine and the US. 
PC(USA) engaged in similar processes with Motorola Solutions and Hewlett-Packard, two other 
companies implicated in Israeli human rights abuses in Palestine. In 2014, the PC(USA) MRTI group 
issued a report that noted, “After several years of corporate engagement by MRTI and its interfaith 
partners, utilizing all the tools available to investors (correspondence, dialogues, proxy voting and 
filing shareholder resolutions), three corporations, Caterpillar, Hewlett-Packard and Motorola 
Solutions, remain entrenched in their involvement in non-peaceful pursuits, and regrettably show no 
inclination to change their behavior. In fact, if anything, these three corporations have deepened their 
non-peaceful involvement.”  
In response, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church decided to divest the funds of the 
Presbyterian Foundation and pensions from Caterpillar and the other two companies. This divestment, 
done publicly, generated media coverage in dozens of outlets, including the New York Times. 
In this case study, the Presbyterian Church used multiple tactics, including shareholder resolutions, in-
person meetings, and letters to demand that Caterpillar change its human rights policy. They did this 
over the course of a decade and in collaboration with other investors and with civil society 
organizations. While other investors continue to engage with Caterpillar over the human rights 
implications of its activities in Israel/Palestine, after ten years of engagement with no change in policy, 
PC(USA) decided to take assertive action and publicly divest to put public pressure on Caterpillar. 
 including “successful lobbying for regulation, or… 
coordinating consumer boycotts that may affect 
the company’s sales.”57 Similarly, Harrington 
argues for long-term coalitions of organizations 
and individuals that include shareholders “to 
provide a truly countervailing power against 
corporate management. From such a broad 
coalition of stakeholders comes a longer-term 
solution for developing more sustainable 
financial growth and security for investors.”58 The 
case study on investor action in the Accord on 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, page 22, 
provides one example of effective investor action 
in collaboration with grassroots and civil society 
organizations. 59 
Indeed, the literature on shareholder advocacy 
suggests that investors can contribute 
substantially to civil society or grassroots 
campaigns. In her paper on “SRI Engagement,” 
Cassandra Higgs writes that “investors add 
weight and credibility to issues that have been 
raised with companies by NGOs.”60 The 
importance of situating investor action in 
coalition with other stakeholder campaigns 
remains a theme in the literature on shareholder 
advocacy. 
Disclosure as a Milestone on the Way to 
Impact 
In certain cases, engagement activities around 
corporate disclosure, such as requesting a 
sustainability report or the reporting of 
greenhouse gas emissions, may be seen as part of 
a progression of activities which over time impact 
company operations or behavior. The initial 
milestone might be to reach a critical mass of 
companies willing to publicly disclose 
information about their practices; this is followed 
by a request that companies report what they 
plan to do to improve their practices, and finally 
by finding leaders within the sector who are 
willing to make changes and push others to 
follow their lead. Ideally, this results in a “race to 
the top,” as companies compete with each other 
to be the most attractive to investors and 
consumers. Pressing companies on disclosure is 
also a way to draw attention to an issue, which 
can be an important first step towards actual 
change. For example, requesting sustainability 
reports, which require companies to report on 
material ESG risks, may be a stepping stone 
toward getting the market to value these issues. 
An example of a successful transition from 
disclosure to meaningful action can be seen in the 
work of CDP, formerly known as the Carbon 
Disclosure Project. This voluntary initiative began 
with CDP asking companies to measure and 
report their greenhouse gas emissions. Next, the 
nonprofit asked them to assess the risks and 
opportunities that their businesses faced from 
climate change. These requests have provided 
CDP with the largest self-reported database on 
corporate climate change information to-date. 
Being able to see which companies are the 
heaviest emitters and whose climate change risks 
are the highest has allowed CDP to take the next 
step of convincing companies to take more 
aggressive steps on emissions reductions.  
The information gleaned by CDP has become 
useful to investors; by requesting transparency 
and standardized information, the CDP allows 
investors to make apples-to-apples comparisons 
of corporate risks and opportunities around 
climate change. They are also able to cite the data 
when filing shareholder resolutions requesting 
sustainability reporting. Investors are able to 
support the initiative by becoming signatories 
and sending letters to companies requesting their 
participation in CDP’s surveys. 
Recently, CDP has begun reporting its findings 
and the annual reductions in emissions that the 
surveys have observed. To date, over 3,000 
companies now disclose their greenhouse gas 
 emissions, as well as climate change and water 
management strategies. According to their report 
in 2012, CDP and investors focused on 300 
companies in 17 high-emitting industries. The 
network sent letters requesting that these 
companies publicly disclose their year-to-year 
emissions reductions targets, as well as their 
expenditure on capital and company profitability. 
Of the 241 who responded, 73% of these set 
targets to reduce emissions. CDP found that 
companies who reported emissions reductions 
activities also reported positive returns on their 
investments that were well above the cost of 
capital needed to make these reductions.61 This 
type of result demonstrates the value that 
disclosure has not only to investors interested in 
assessing risk, but also to companies themselves 
 
 
In 2010, trade unions and workers’ rights groups in Bangladesh and around the world began organizing a codified 
set of Health and Safety Action Points for international companies buying garments produced in Bangladeshi 
factories. Following the devastating collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building on April 24, 2013, which killed 
over 1,100 workers, this coalition put together a new Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and asked 
international unions and companies to sign by May 15th. The Accord addresses problems that have led to 
preventable factory disasters in the past decade in Bangladesh, including provisions for independent safety 
inspectors, health and safety training for workers with trade union involvement, and buyer support for safety 
upgrades and renovations.  
In the United States, trade unions and workers’ rights groups organized campaigns targeting US-based clothing 
companies that purchased products from Bangladeshi factories to sign on to the Accord.  For example, United 
Students Against Sweatshops staged campaigns on over 30 campuses, pressuring universities to only use college-
logo brands that had signed the Accord. Other labor groups staged picket lines outside of Gap, North Face, and 
Adidas stores across the United States. 
The movement for more rigorous factory safety in Bangladesh has for years been led by local and international 
worker organizations like the National Garment Workers Federation, Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers 
Federation, Bangladesh Independent Garment Worker Union Federation, and the Bangladesh Center for Worker 
Solidarity. The US-based campaign targeting American companies buying from Bangladeshi factories involved a 
broad coalition of student organizations, labor unions, and other civil society groups. Yet a group of investors 
recognized that their engagement with these companies could provide particular leverage. These engaged 
investors effectively used two sign-on letters to put additional pressure on publicly-traded American companies to 
join the Accord. 
On May 16th, 2013, a group of investors led by Boston Common Asset Management, Domini Social Investments, the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate, and Trillium Asset 
Management released a letter asking 27 relevant companies that they held to join the Accord. The 123 investor 
signatories of the letter, with over $1.2 trillion in assets under management, included religious institutional 
investors, responsible investment coalitions, and money managers.  
Additionally, investors led by Boston Common engaged directly with Adidas, Inditex, Li & Fung, and Nike, asking 
them to sign the Accord. Following this engagement and additional pressure from workers’ rights groups, Adidas 
signed on to the Accord. 
In this case study, engaged investors did not initiate or even lead the campaign asking American companies to sign 
on to the Accord. However, by buttressing the efforts of grassroots organizations and labor unions in Bangladesh 
and their international NGO partners, engaged investors contributed towards the goal of sustainable and 
substantive change in working conditions for Bangladeshi factory workers. Engaged investors utilized their 
unique position to pressure public companies to sign on to an established workplace safety accord. 
 
 as they work to improve their operations and 
minimize their ESG impacts.  
Disclosure around political spending is another 
example of a strategic multistage approach to 
engagement. The 2010 Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission Supreme Court decision 
resulted in the ability of corporations to spend 
unlimited amounts of money in the political 
sphere. Additionally, this meant companies could 
provide money to 501(c)4 non-profit 
organizations without having to disclose. Many 
investors are concerned about the effects of this 
decision, both in terms of the political power it 
provides to companies with deep pockets, and 
also because the lack of disclosure can pose a risk 
to portfolios, as corporations may fund 
candidates whose stances are in opposition to the 
best interests of shareholders.  
As a result, a coalition of investors, led largely by 
the nonprofit Center for Political Accountability 
(CPA), has been leading a campaign for greater 
disclosure. According to its website, “CPA is the 
only group to directly engage companies to 
improve disclosure and oversight of their 
political spending.”62 As a result of this work, 
“almost 70 percent of companies in the top 
echelons of the S&P 500 are now disclosing 
political spending made directly to candidates, 
parties and committees.”63 However, CPA has 
been able to take this even further, by requesting 
that companies disclose their indirect political 
spending to trade associations and nonprofits 
such as the US Chamber of Commerce and 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). 
Currently, nearly 50 percent of companies in the 
S&P 500 are disclosing on this front as well.64 
One way to see the impact that the CPA’s effort 
has had is through the response of groups such as 
the US Chamber of Commerce. In October 2013, 
the Chamber, along with the Business Roundtable 
and the National Association of Manufacturers, 
circulated a letter which charged CPA with 
initiating a “campaign to quiet American 
business” and included a list of “tools for 
responding to activists” who were pushing for 
disclosure.65 The fact that these powerful 
organizations felt compelled to respond to the 
actions of CPA and its allies demonstrates their 
effectiveness in changing corporate attitudes and 
behavior. 
Thanks to the work of CPA and other grassroots 
organizations, this issue has also drawn the 
attention of the American public more broadly. 
Harvard Law professor Lucian Bebchuk 
submitted a petition to the SEC proposing that it 
force companies to disclose their political 
spending to shareholders. It has now received 
over one million comments, the highest number 
of comments for a petition to-date.66 
Investor engagement for sustainability reporting 
or other disclosure, on its own, may seem 
toothless. However, investors often frame their 
resolutions to include a disclosure request 
because of the need to conform to complicated 
SEC rules, and framing resolved clauses as a 
disclosure request will often garner more 
support from institutional investors. Combined 
with the non-binding nature of the proposals, this 
may create an appearance of “weak” demands, 
but such is the tradeoff for obtaining space on the 
proxy ballot and commanding management’s 
attention. When utilized as part of a long-term 
strategy of engagement designed to make social 
or environmental impact, disclosure can be an 
important and strategic milestone.  
  
hus far, efforts to document the ultimate 
impact of engaged public equity investing 
have remained largely anecdotal. For 
example, in an August 2013 paper entitled 
“Impact of Sustainable and Responsible 
Investing,” US SIF described the impact that 
shareholder engagement strategies can have on 
publicly traded companies, highlighting 
numerous compelling examples, from Trillium 
Asset Management and As You Sow’s work on 
Massey Energy sustainability performance, to a 
multi-investor collaboration that led to Gap 
improving working conditions in over 300 
factories, to the Say on Pay campaign (see case 
study on page 29).67,68 Meanwhile, those who do 
try to measure levels of shareholder engagement 
focus mostly on the quantitative data related to 
proxy voting and shareholder resolutions. Such 
efforts can describe trends in shareholder 
engagement, but capture very little about impact. 
By only measuring ESG engagement through 
tracking of resolutions and proxy votes, existing 
resources do not capture the full extent of the 
impact of equity engagement and the full range of 
tools used by shareholder proponents.  Simply 
filing large numbers of shareholder resolutions  
 
 
does not necessarily mean that one investor has 
more social or environmental impact than 
another—an investor that joins in one 
collaborative effort that utilizes multiple tactics in 
long-term engagement around a particular issue 
may have more impact than another investor that 
files dozens of shareholder resolutions but does 
not follow up with any companies.  
The IE2 reporting framework aims to situate 
shareholder resolutions and proxy votes within 
the broader spectrum of engagement activities 
and within the broader field of impact 
measurement that has emerged over the last 
decade. 
Impact Metrics and Ratings of 
Companies and Managers 
The trend of responsible and impact investing is 
shifting from principles-based systems towards 
metric-based systems.69 The field of impact 
measurement is incredibly active, with over 150 
tools, methods and best practices available at the 
Foundation Center/McKinsey Tools and 
Resources for Assessing Social Impact (TRASI) 
database.70  
T 
 The GIIN, dedicated to increasing the scale and 
effectiveness of impact investing through 
outreach,  has developed the Impact Reporting 
and Investment Standards (IRIS), which has a 
very detailed library of standardized social, 
environmental, and financial performance 
indicators meant to apply across sectors and 
regions. These metrics are used to evaluate the 
companies in which one is invested; however 
IRIS is not a reporting framework or database.71 
Rather, it provides a standardized list of metrics 
to refer to when developing a report so that 
definitions can be consistent across years and 
companies. None of these cataloged metrics 
appear related specifically to the role of investors 
in listed equities, or to the strategies of investor 
engagement.  Many of the metrics outlined in IRIS 
overlap with the metric definitions in the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), a widely used global 
framework for standardized reporting on ESG 
sustainability performance.  Organizations can 
select the relevant metrics from the IRIS library 
to set up an individualized framework of 
performance objectives and sector-specific 
sustainability metrics. Partner sets of metrics 
have been developed by industry experts and 
groups using the IRIS metric sets for specific 
impact measurement fields, such as land 
conservation, sustainable agriculture, 
microfinance, and health. Thus, the IRIS metrics 
can be used to track performance of the 
companies being engaged with, and their 
improvement over time, but do not yet have the 
capability to measure the engagement pursued 
by investors and its resulting impact. However, 
these metrics may be useful for aligning our new 
framework with other impact investing rating 
systems, such as the Global Impact Investing 
Ratings System (GIIRS). 
The GIIRS Index, run by B Lab, is a transparent 
and comprehensive ESG impact rating system for 
both companies and funds, built using a selection 
of IRIS metrics and the B Analytics platform.72 It 
is primarily designed for rating companies who 
are looking for impact investment capital. Fund 
impact ratings combine an assessment of the 
fund manager (10 percent of the rating) and the 
combined scores of the companies within the 
fund’s portfolio (90 percent of the rating). There 
are investment management companies which 
have been impact-rated by GIIRS, some of which 
engage regularly in active ownership activities. 
However, among the metrics, there is no 
consideration for the specific features of different 
asset classes, nor any discussion of investor 
engagement and its impact. Therefore the 
potential impact of the asset managers’ 
engagement activities is not being included in 
their overall impact rating.  
Alternatively, the GRI reporting framework is 
designed to provide a standardized way for 
companies to report on their sustainability 
activities and performance, promoting 
transparency and disclosure by organizations. 
While stakeholder inclusiveness is a major 
principle for GRI reporting, it focuses on 
companies engaging with their employees, 
shareholders and suppliers. GRI is not geared 
toward reporting on the engagement of owners 
or managers of public equity investments with 
those companies on ESG issues.73 Both the GRI 
and GIIRS frameworks can be used to track the 
change in ESG performance at the company level. 
However, they are not able to track the impact of 
public equity investors’ engagement activities.  
Simply filing large numbers of 
shareholder resolutions does not 
necessarily mean that one investor 
has more social or environmental 
impact than another. 
 Existing Reports for Equity Engagement 
and their Limitations 
The best effort to obtain investor data on 
engagement is that of the PRI, which has 
pioneered an annual reporting framework for its 
signatories. All signatories submit yearly reports 
to the PRI on their responsible investment 
activities, which it aggregates for its Annual 
Progress Report.74 Starting in 2013, signatories 
have been required to publicly disclose some 
mandatory data and encouraged to voluntarily 
disclose other data, which the PRI publishes 
online as a “Transparency Report.”75 Additionally, 
as of the 2013/2014 reporting cycle, every PRI 
signatory is required to use the new reporting 
framework, which requires self-reporting of both 
quantitative and qualitative data points (see 
Figure 4).  
The PRI reporting framework asks signatories to 
discuss both quantitative and qualitative 
information about their public equity 
engagement (categorized as “Listed Equity Active 
Ownership,” or LEA.)76 Specifically, one question 
asks for the number of engagements, and another 
asks for the number of engagements that resulted 
in companies that changed or committed to 
change as a result of engagement.77 In the 
explanatory notes for the LEA section, the PRI 
Source: PRI 
 
 
Figure 4. PRI Reporting Framework on Listed Equity Active Ownership 
 reporting framework describes how signatories 
should approach the question on “outcomes” of 
engagement. The guidance reads, “Describe the 
changes, if any, in corporate practice that resulted 
from the voting decision.”78  
The PRI reporting framework also asks for 
qualitative information on public equity 
engagement. There are questions about what 
types of engagement the investor used, including 
methods such as dialogue, proxy voting, or 
confrontation; about reasons for engagement; 
about monitoring, evaluation, and reporting 
processes of engagements; and about the 
investor’s prioritization processes in terms of 
deciding what to engage on. Finally, the reporting 
framework has room for investors to report three 
or more examples of their engagements, such as 
successful shareholder resolutions. 
However, the PRI reporting framework does not 
account for many of the factors that the literature 
has identified as important to impactful 
shareholder engagement, specifically the full 
spectrum of collaboration and the importance of 
escalation, discussed above. The PRI framework 
defines “collaborative engagements” as those that 
the “investor conducts jointly with other 
investors,” whether through informal 
associations or through an organized investor 
network.79 This definition of “collaboration” does 
not account for coordination with grassroots 
campaigns or civil society organizations. 
Additionally, the PRI reporting framework has no 
concrete way to report on repeated engagements 
around the same issue or on investor persistence 
over time. 
Measuring the Impact of Engagement 
Given this gap between today’s limited data on 
engagement and the actual determinants of 
successful investor engagements with publicly 
traded companies, the IE2 Reporting Framework 
aims to provide a more comprehensive system 
for documenting and analyzing investor 
engagements and their ultimate environmental 
and social outcomes. 
The reporting framework aims to be: 
■ A space that allows investors to define 
what they are doing and tell their own 
stories. 
■ A place to model and highlight elements 
of good engagement – to identify what 
practices are likely to lead to successful 
change in the company’s behavior. 
■ A standardized reporting format for 
comparing activities and performance 
between engagements by theme and 
company, and eventually across investors. 
■ A way to understand how engagement 
can be most effective, and how investors 
can maximize leverage. 
At the same time, the new reporting framework 
will help investors monitor the progress of their 
engagements. In consultation interviews, 
institutional investors and money managers alike 
noted that tracking shareholder engagements is 
difficult for investors. One interviewee told us 
their firm’s process was “ad-hoc and haphazard”; 
another noted that “figuring out a process to 
track and measure even the few dozen companies 
we engage with is challenging.” These investors 
indicated interest in an internal tool that would 
help them better demonstrate impact in 
quantifiable, rather than anecdotal, ways.  
The preliminary framework will remain private 
and unscored during its initial development.   
   
 
 
 
Investors and consumers have been growing increasingly concerned about the effect that palm oil 
plantations are having on the planet’s climate, forests, and biodiversity. As the demand for palm oil has 
been increasing by 8 percent per year, the rate of land clearance—often via burning—to make room for 
expanding palm oil plantations has risen sharply. Clearing land to grow palm oil has resulted in not only 
the destruction of carbon rich rainforests, primarily in Indonesia and Malaysia, but also of peatlands. 
Peat is able to store 18-28 times the amount of carbon that forests do, so the drainage of them is even 
more harmful to the atmosphere as this carbon is released. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) was created in 2004 in an attempt to bring accountability to the palm oil supply chain, but 
because it is entirely voluntary, has a poor track record of enforcement, and is dominated by the palm oil 
industry, many stakeholders were concerned about its efficacy. 
Recognizing the risks associated with palm oil production, investors pressed companies to take direct 
responsibility for upholding strong environmental and social standards in their palm oil supply chains. 
In the fall of 2013, Green Century Capital Management raised concerns on Kellogg’s quarterly earnings 
call about the company’s recently announced partnership with Wilmar—the world’s largest palm oil 
trader, who, despite being an RSPO member since 2005, was also ranked the least sustainable company 
in the world by Newsweek in 2011 and 2012. Green Century pressed Kellogg’s CEO about how the 
company would protect its brand and reputation against the controversial activities of its supply chain 
partner. A Bloomberg reporter picked up on Green Century’s question, writing an article that drew 
public attention to the issue and elevate concerns about unsustainable palm oil production with 
Kellogg’s senior management. Unsatisfied with Kellogg’s response, Green Century proceeded to file a 
shareholder proposal pressing Kellogg’s to adopt stronger safeguards for verifying that its suppliers 
were upholding sustainable practices for producing palm oil. During discussions and negotiations with 
Green Century, Kellogg’s was also in discussions with Wilmar about shareholder and public concerns 
around deforestation.  
At the same time, Green Century also launched a letter writing campaign with over forty other 
institutional investors urging key companies in the palm oil supply chain, including Wilmar, to move 
beyond the RSPO guidelines and “adopt policies that would ensure palm oil development does not 
contribute to deforestation, development on peatlands, or human rights violations.” This pressure, along 
with the help of Glenn Hurowitz, a negotiator from the consulting firm Climate Advisers who flew to 
Singapore to speak with the company, led to meaningful results: on December 5, 2013, Wilmar 
announced its “No Deforestation, No Peat, No Exploitation Policy,” which applies across Wilmar’s entire 
supply chain, and went into effect immediately. Wilmar controls 45 percent of global palm oil trade: due 
to the size of the company, this new policy “will eliminate more than 1.5Gt of CO2 emissions between 
now and 2020” if fully implemented, according to Climate Advisors, the equivalent of what Central and 
South America emit annually. Shortly after Wilmar’s announcement, Kellogg’s announced its own palm 
oil sourcing commitment in response to the shareholder proposal issued by Green Century, requiring all 
of its suppliers to provide palm oil independently verified as “protecting forests, peatlands and human 
rights” by December 2015. In the company’s official announcement, Kellogg’s quotes Green Century and 
recognizes their role in developing the new policy. Since these initial commitments, more than a dozen 
major food and beverage companies, traders and grocery store chains have followed suit in a “race to 
the top,” with pledges to source 100 percent fully traceable, responsibly produced palm oil. As of the 
most recent count, more than 60 percent of the global palm oil supply is now covered by deforestation-
free policies. 
As demonstrated in this case, coordinated pressure from key stakeholders—including investors, the 
media and other companies—can prompt a company to respond and shift its practices. It also makes 
clear that engagement milestones achieved with one company can snowball into impact across an entire 
industry. 
   
 
 
 
In the first decade of the 2000s, stakeholders and investors alike focused attention on executive 
compensation packages at large public companies. As the disparity between executive and worker pay at 
large public companies continued to grow, risky corporate behavior was attributed in part to excessive 
pay practices and incentives. 
A number of investors took action to add new checks on executive compensation at US public companies. 
In particular, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), Employees 
Pension Plan and Walden Asset Management, a division of Boston Trust & Investment Management 
Company, led a multi-year engagement around executive compensation that helped precipitate significant 
national policy change. This case study highlights the history of the Say on Pay campaign and the 
relationship between shareholder engagement and public policy. 
In 2006, AFSCME filed experimental shareholder resolutions with Sun Microsystems, Sara Lee, 
Countrywide Mortgage, Home Depot, and US Bancorp asking for a “Say on Pay”—an advisory shareholder 
vote on executive compensation practices, already legally mandated in the United Kingdom. According to 
a history of Say on Pay published by AASBCR, an organization of AT&T Ameritech and SBC Retirees that 
filed multiple Say on Pay resolutions with AT&T, the average support on these early resolutions was over 
42%. Between 2007 and 2009, a coalition of over 70 institutional and individual shareholders filed 
resolutions at more than 100 US corporations asking for a shareholder Say on Pay. Votes on these 
resolutions were very strong; many were over 35 percent. Following the 2009 shareholder meeting 
season, nine companies agreed to voluntarily adopt Say on Pay—and by 2010, dozens of companies had 
voluntarily adopted Say on Pay. 
This shareholder action helped precipitate policy action. In 2007, US Representative Barney Frank 
introduced legislation to make Say on Pay votes an SEC requirement for all public companies. According 
to Timothy Smith, the Director of ESG Shareholder Engagement at Walden, the goal of the Say on Pay 
shareholder resolutions was “both to encourage individual companies to adopt Say on Pay, but also to 
show the SEC and Congress strong investor support for Say on Pay.” Walden and AFSCME also helped 
convene a Working Group on the Advisory Vote on Executive Pay Disclosure, where investors and 
companies together discussed how a Say on Pay requirement might be implemented in US markets. The 
Working Group held two Roundtables, attended by over 100 company representatives, lawyers, 
compensation experts, and investors.  
In 2007, Representative Frank convened Congressional hearings on Say and Pay, and invited investors to 
testify and participate. Finally, on July 21, 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which included language requiring a “say on pay” vote on executive 
compensation for all public companies at least once every three years, along with a shareholder advisory 
vote on the frequency of say on pay votes. 
 Early adopters may use it on an individual basis 
solely for the purpose of tracking engagements. 
However, following the model of similar 
frameworks, this tool can evolve into a powerful 
analytical tool for comparing investors across the 
field. For example, the GRI initially created its 
reporting framework to encourage companies to 
integrate sustainability into their operations 
without scoring. After several years of reporting, 
GRI organizational stakeholder have begun 
scoring companies along the GRI reporting 
framework. Similarly, we envision the 
engagement reporting framework becoming a 
quantitative tool that could measure the relative 
impacts of different listed equity investments in a 
portfolio.  
Naturally, there remain many aspects of 
engagement that cannot be measured, so any 
framework to document the impact of equity 
engagement must acknowledge the inherent 
limitations of purely quantifiable impact metrics. 
Nevertheless, many aspects are readily 
measurable such as progress towards goals, types 
of issues addressed, the kinds of engagements 
used, and the data used to hold companies 
accountable for their commitments.  
The proposed reporting framework strives to 
standardize and facilitate reporting of 
shareholder engagement activities.   
Development of Reporting Framework 
The IE2 engagement reporting framework (ERF) 
was developed through many iterations, 
combining feedback from the steering committee 
and a lengthy consultation process with 
stakeholders and experts in the field. The 
framework has been developed in document 
form, and will be initially implemented in 
spreadsheet format. The model framework 
represents how an online database would 
function, adding value by allowing the user to 
cross reference the reported data. The 
framework design can be found in Appendix 3.  
The framework has three levels: the overarching 
engagement issue, specific engagement activities, 
and the details of each activity (Figure 5). Each 
level is composed of detailed questions about 
Figure 5. Overview of IE2 Reporting Framework 
 both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of an 
investor’s engagements. The 
first tier, overarching 
engagement, gathers 
information on the 
engagement theme or issue: 
environmental, social, or 
governance; and a specific 
category, such as pollution, 
human rights, or board 
diversity. Issues can be 
cross-listed, or “tagged,” with 
additional themes if 
appropriate—for example, 
engagement around palm oil 
often touches both the social 
issue of land rights and the 
environmental issues of 
conservation and climate 
change. The ability to “tag” 
an engagement with multiple 
themes reflects the complexity of many 
engagement issues and allows the framework to 
be interactive and dynamic. Users can then enter 
information about the general engagement issue 
at the highest level, including other activity 
happening around the issue, the leaders of the 
effort, and how they are coordinating with others 
(Figure 6).  
At the second tier, users add specific engagement 
activities they have done or plan to do around the 
issue, selecting activities from the engagement 
taxonomy described above and detailed in 
Appendix 1. Investors then answer questions 
about the timeframe of the activity: when it was 
started; whether it is ongoing, completed, 
abandoned, or planned for the future; and the 
duration of the activity.  
The third tier of the reporting framework 
contains specific details on each activity, 
including the investor’s role, milestones that 
indicate progress, and the ultimate objective of 
the engagement. Users have the option to add 
multiple milestones, depending on the nature of 
the activity. These milestones allow users to 
tailor their tracking system to their specific 
engagements, as not all activities can be 
measured in the same way. Some activities are 
complex and have multiple objectives, and 
therefore multiple milestones, while others may 
be very straightforward. Each milestone can be 
accompanied by quantitative and qualitative data 
to track progress. Lastly, the ultimate objective 
reflects the goal of the overall engagement 
activity; like the milestones, users can upload 
data used to track their progress. 
Ultimately, the responses to all of these questions 
will populate fields in an internal database that 
the company will use to keep track of their 
engagements.  
The research team has designed the framework 
to function as a complement to the PRI reporting 
framework for listed equity active engagement, 
both by creating a place to report out on all the 
aspects of engagement that are not included in 
the PRI—for example, op-eds, testimony, 
soliciting votes from other shareholders, and 
benchmarking—and also by helping investors 
complete the PRI Transparency Report. As we 
learned through the consultation process, many 
investors have experienced difficulty and 
frustration with completing the new annual PRI 
Transparency Report, which asks signatories to 
tabulate and quantify different types of 
engagements, in a way that frequently does not 
line up with how investors track their own 
engagements. After careful review of the PRI 
reporting framework, the IE2 reporting 
framework was designed to calculate several of 
the answers to the PRI questions. For example, 
the PRI asks users to enter the number of 
engagements with an Environmental (E), Social 
(S), or Governance (G) focus. Many investors do 
Figure 6. Top Tier of IE2 
Reporting Framework 
Which company are 
you engaging with?
What issue(s) is the 
engagement 
addressing?
Who is leading the 
overall engagement 
effort?
What other activity is 
happening around this 
issue? How are you 
coordinating?
 not necessarily keep track of the number of each 
type of engagement, and currently estimate this 
number manually. Based on data from the top 
tier—the overall engagement issue—the IE2 
reporting framework would assign an E, S, or G 
from the user’s selection and tags, and can easily 
tally the total number for each category, including 
crossover issues. Similarly, the database can tally 
numbers of individual and collaborative 
engagements for the PRI based on the user’s 
selection of their role in an activity within this 
database.  
Additionally, many investors provide public 
updates on their engagements. In order to 
facilitate this kind of transparency, the 
framework will allow each level to be made 
public or kept private, depending on the nature of 
the information contained. For example, an 
investor may want to generate a report on all of 
the different engagement issues they are involved 
in, but would like to keep certain details on the 
specific activities private.  
Once implemented, we envision users will be able 
to access and review their engagement history 
and plans by searching by theme, company they 
engage with, engagement activity, and 
milestones. The proposed database could readily 
provide statistics about their track record, and 
perhaps could be linked to some a live feed on an 
organization’s website, among other uses. Users 
could perform analytics on the output to identify 
strengths and weaknesses of their engagements. 
For example, the database could provide a “heat 
map” to demonstrate an investor’s range across 
issue areas and engagement activities. The 
following example (Figures 7 and 8) shows a 
fairly large SRI money manager who uses a 
number of engagement activities across a range 
of environmental, social, and governance issues. 
To view more examples comparing different 
types of investors, please see Appendix 4. 
In Figure 9, we use a mosaic plot to show the 
engagement activities of the investor by activity 
category (identified on the left-most column, and 
by color), and by ESG focus (identified across the 
top). Here, the same investor is more involved in 
environmental and social issues than in 
governance ones, as shown by the width of the 
columns. They are also very actively involved in 
the proxy process, somewhat active in dialogue, 
and conduct very few policy or assertive action-
type engagements, as shown by the height of the 
sub-rectangles within each column. Figure 10 
shows the same information, but goes one step  
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Figure 10. Impact of the Investor's Engagements by Themes and Activity Areas 
 
Note: The darker section indicates “successful” engagements. 
 further by demonstrating the impact of these 
activities, by reporting “successful” actions in a 
darker color, and “unsuccessful” actions in a 
lighter shade of the same color. This distinction is 
still notional, as the success or impact of 
engagement actions is still part of the work to be 
done in the next phase of the IE2 initiative. 
However, this could be a useful output for 
internal and eventually external use. For 
example, while the bulk of this investor’s activity 
is within the proxy process category, it has a high 
proportion of impactful actions in both dialogues 
and in the more limited social policy work that it 
does. By demonstrating impact in this way, 
investors can show the quality, as well as the 
quantity of engagements in which they are 
involved.  
Another interesting function that merits future 
exploration is an implementation of the 
framework as a cloud-based database. This 
database could aggregate engagement and impact 
information from individual investors into an 
anonymized dataset, in order to help identify best 
practices and analyze the overall equity 
engagement space. Such a dataset could provide 
insight into what types of engagement are most 
likely to lead to impactful change at the company 
level and at the sector level. Investors could also 
choose to make certain engagement activities 
public (i.e., non-anonymous), allowing more 
precise analytical comparisons between 
investors.  
The scatterplot in Figure 11 demonstrates one 
way that this aggregate data could be used. Here 
we show investors of various asset size 
(indicated by the size of the bubbles) and 
compare them by both the number of activities 
within a particular engagement as well as the 
impact that they have. The activities would be 
weighted by the degree of involvement—for 
example, an investor who took a leadership role 
on a company dialogue would be weighted more 
heavily than one who signed onto an investor 
letter—and would also take into consideration 
how many different types of engagement 
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 activities have been conducted in a particular 
engagement. Impact would be determined based 
on the metrics provided in the framework around 
achieved milestones. In the example shown here, 
the Highly Engaged, Low Impact firm ranks high 
on the number of activities it has conducted, but 
its impact is lower than the Small and Highly 
Engaged investor, who has taken part in fewer 
activities but has been extremely effective in 
achieving impact for those it chose to participate 
in.  
Next Steps for the IE2 Framework 
The framework outlined in this report will be 
implemented in a flat spreadsheet model and 
tested by a selection of IE2 initiative partners, 
who have committed to track all activities on one 
or more overarching engagement themes. After a 
period of six months to a year, we will review 
their use of the tool and gather feedback to 
further increase the tool’s efficacy. The data 
gathered will also be inspected to make some 
preliminary analyses of the engagement activities 
and milestones recorded, in order to develop the 
most useful reporting tools. 
Opportunities for collaboration and 
harmonization with existing metrics and 
frameworks will be explored in more detail, 
including the GIIN’s IRIS metrics library, B Lab’s B 
Analytics, and the PRI Reporting Framework.  
After revising and finalizing the IE2 reporting 
framework through a stakeholder consultation 
process, a database developer will be brought in 
to design a secure web-based software solution. 
The IE2 reporting framework will be marketed to 
public equity investors.  
This new framework will not create more impact 
through engagement in and of itself. However, by 
creating a way to document, track, and quantify, 
where possible, the impact of engagements, we 
hope to improve investors’ future efforts by 
maximizing their impact opportunities.
  
  
nstitutional investors and money managers 
interested in engendering positive 
environmental and social impact—from 
impact investors to PRI signatories—have begun 
considering shareholder engagement with public 
equities as an important tool of socially 
responsible investing. Indeed, historical analysis 
and case studies demonstrate that shareholder 
engagement, which includes the proxy process, 
direct dialogue with portfolio companies, public 
policy work, and assertive action, is a key way for 
investors to leverage their public equity holdings 
for ESG impact. 
Some investor networks and nonprofit groups 
track ESG shareholder resolutions and proxy 
votes, and the PRI now requires all signatories to 
report out on collaborative and individual equity 
engagement activities. However, these reporting 
frameworks have no way to account for 
collaboration with non-investor stakeholders, or 
milestones achieved in the process of escalating 
engagement over time. Our analysis 
demonstrates that these qualitative factors may 
be some of the most important aspects in 
successful engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Equity Engagement initiative 
proposes a new reporting framework for public 
equity engagement that strives to account for 
these qualitative, as well as quantitative, aspects. 
The IE2 Reporting Framework provides a 
powerful tool to document the impact of 
shareholder engagement on environmental, 
social, and corporate governance outcomes. With 
initial support from philanthropy and engaged 
investors, this new reporting framework can help 
investors track and report on the impact of their 
own engagements—and, eventually, through an 
anonymized data set, will identify and analyze 
industry-wide best practices for impactful 
engagement. As investors increasingly pursue 
Total Portfolio Activation—integrating 
environmental, social, and governance 
performance and impact across all asset 
classes—shareholder engagement in listed 
equities will be an important piece of the total 
portfolio puzzle.
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Appendix 1: Engagement Taxonomy 
 
Proxy Process 
Proxy Voting 
■ Cast proxy votes in favor of environmental, social and governance shareholder resolutions 
■ Develop proxy voting guidelines to support environmental, social and governance shareholder 
resolutions 
■ Create guidelines for other investors  
■ Disclose your proxy votes online 
■ Advertise your intention to cast proxy votes in favor of ESG resolutions ahead of annual meetings 
■ Write a letter to a company explaining your vote and urging a Yes/No vote on shareholder 
resolutions 
 
Shareholder Resolution Filing 
■ File or co-file shareholder resolutions to ask for positive changes in corporate ESG disclosure, 
policies and practices 
■ Engage with proxy advisory firms, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, regarding upcoming shareholder 
resolutions in order to encourage their support 
■ Post a non-exempt solicitation on the SEC’s EDGAR site 
■ Lend shares/proxies 
▪ Provide your proxy to someone else  
▪ Use your proxy to bring other stakeholders to the annual meeting   
■ Participate in Floor Resolution 
▪ Pose a resolution on the floor 
▪ Move a floor vote, ideally with advanced notice to other shareholders of intention to do so 
■ Borrow shares to get called on during the meeting and pose your question to the board 
 
Dialogue 
■ Direct dialogue/meeting with companies 
▪ Dialogue between individual investor and companies 
▪ Join fellow shareholders in dialoguing with companies 
▪ Dialogue through investor networks 
▪ Dialogue through multi-stakeholder engagements with companies and civil society  
▪ Multi-company/multi-investor conversations.  
 
 ▪ Reach out and identify multi-stakeholder dialogues, at the initiation of the company 
■ Act as the catalyst/honest broker in conversations between a company and an NGO or more 
confrontational investor 
■ Participate in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
▪ Lead or co-lead an initiative 
▪ Be actively involved in initiative 
▪ Lend your name to an initiative (eg, sign on to letters, provide sponsorship or financial 
support) 
■ Take collective action/campaign with other investors 
▪ Use public pressure on companies through media 
▪ Write op-eds, letters to the editor 
▪ Blog on own site or others’ 
▪ Produce reports 
■ Coordinate with civil society 
■ Exercise investor voice without holding shares 
▪ Engage with companies prior to purchasing shares 
▪ Engage with companies whose shares aren’t held 
▪ Exit: Sell and communicate concerns to the company 
Policy 
Note that many of these strategies can apply to both government policy and industry policy (IFC, UN, etc) 
■ Send comment letters on proposed rules/regulations 
■ Comment/engage on SEC rules 
■ Ask companies to be a public voice for a policy 
■ Submit public testimony 
■ Submit Amicus briefs 
■ Produce reports which identify best practices/benchmarking for policymakers 
■ Encourage regulatory bodies to codify best ESG practices, and to set up metrics and measure 
■ Help shape industry regulation to promote better ESG practices 
■ Write public policy opinion editorials and reports 
 
Assertive Action 
■ Legal Action  
▪ Participate in 10B-5 lawsuit 
■ Pursue a seat on the board 
■ Use public press campaigns 
■ Participate in organized divestment campaigns 
■ Organize divestment campaigns 
 
 
 Appendix 2: Engagement Themes 
 
Environmental 
■ Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
■ Environment & Health 
▪ Toxics 
▪ Pollution 
▪ Food Safety 
 
■ Sustainable Agriculture 
▪ GMOs 
▪ Water 
▪ Deforestation (palm,  
▪ Palm Oil 
■ Sustainability Reporting 
■ Wood products 
▪ FSC Certification 
▪ Logging 
■ Product waste 
▪ Recycling 
▪ Waste treatment 
▪ Manufacturing 
■ Water 
▪ Pollution 
▪ Conservation 
■ Animal Welfare 
▪ Product testing 
▪ Entertainment 
▪ Factory farming 
■ Energy 
▪ Fracking 
▪ Renewables 
▪ Oil Sands 
▪ Offshore Drilling 
 
 
 
Social 
■ EEO 
▪ LGBTQ non-discrimination 
▪ Board diversity 
▪ Women’s equality 
■ Finance and Banking 
▪ Pay-day loans 
▪ Predatory lending 
■ Labor Issues (non-EEO) 
▪ Child labor 
▪ Labor and employment 
▪ Workplace practices 
▪ Workplace safety 
▪ Card-check agreement 
■ Healthcare 
▪ Access to medicine 
■ Human Rights 
▪ Human trafficking 
▪ Indigenous People’s Rights 
▪ Human Right to Water 
■ Fair Trade 
■ Supply Chain 
■ Conflict Minerals 
■ Media 
▪ Net neutrality 
▪ Data privacy and surveillance 
■ Peace & Social Justice 
■ Emerging Markets Disclosure Project 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance 
■ Executive Pay 
■ Board Issues 
 Diversity 
 Director nomination process 
■ Disclosure  
■ Political Contributions and lobbying 
■ Tax Policy Principles 
■ Shareholder engagement 
 In-perso n shareholder meetings 
 Proxy voting policies 
  
Appendix 3: Engagement Reporting Framework
… 
Your role in this activity
Who initiated this activity?
______________________
Who is leading thisactivity?
______________________
Who else is involved in this activity 
(if applicable)?
Your role:
□ Lead
□ Co-lead
□ Active participant
□ Passive participant
Further comments on your role 
or others'.
Milestone 1
What is the first milestone 
to be achieved (i.e., specific 
change in corporate policy 
or practice sought)?
Has the milestone been 
met? Describe the 
outcomes.
What metrics and/or 
qualitative data have you 
used (or could you use) to 
track this?
Please provide that data if 
available.
Add Milestone?
□ Yes    □ No
What are the remaining milestones to 
be achieved?
Is there evidence of these milestones 
being met? Describe the outcomes.
What are the metrics and/or 
qualitative data that you have used (or 
could use) to track this?
Please provide that data if available.
Ultimate Objective
What is the ultimate objective to be 
achieved (wider social and environmental 
impact, i.e., on employees, stakeholders, 
communities, ecosystems)?
What did/will provide evidence of this 
objective being achieved?
What are the metrics and/or qualitative 
data that you have used (or could use) to 
track this?
Please provide that data if available
Activity 2: 
 
□ Don’t 
include in 
public version 
 
Overarching engagement                    □ Don’t include in public version 
Which company 
are you engaging 
with?
What issue(s) is the 
engagement addressing? 
(select from engagement 
theme list)
Who is leading 
the overall 
engagement 
effort? 
What other activity is happening around 
this particular issues/company by other 
investors, NGOs, and public policy 
activities. To what extent are you trying to 
coordinate with them?
Select from 
engagement 
activity list
Is this an...
□ Ongoing engagement
□ Future engagement
□ Completed engagement
□ Abandoned engagment
(Anticipated) Starting 
date of engagement: 
________ 
Duration of 
engagement: 
________ 
wks/mths/yrs
Activity 1                     □ Don’t include in public version 
 Appendix 4: Additional Charts and Visuals 
 
This appendix demonstrates the different ways to visually represent companies’ engagement activities 
using data that would be collected in the IE2 Reporting Framework.  
Three hypothetical investors are profiled to show the range of engagement issues and activities. The 
profiles, below, are followed by the corresponding charts for each company. We walk the reader through a 
series of radar charts and mosaic plots for each of the investor types, followed by a comparison of three 
stacked bar charts which display the same information in another format. Finally, we include the Investor 
Map of Equity Engagement, a tool to potentially help map the impact of one’s equity investments based on 
engagement activity.   
 
 
Investor A Profile: 
Investor A is well known in the SRI space, as they have been a lead on many large multi-stakeholder 
campaigns. They are consistently engaging with various companies on all different issues, from palm oil to 
worker safety to executive compensation. They also use a variety of techniques in their engagements, 
including the usual shareholder resolution filing and proxy voting, and they almost always combine these 
practices with a dialogue or letter to the company. They have published numerous reports in an attempt to 
influence policy at the highest level, and have even participated in several lawsuits, most recently targeting 
a company that was dumping toxic waste in large waterway.  
Investor B Profile: 
Investor B has been involved in shareholder engagement for quite some time. As a company, they focus 
almost exclusively on governance issues, as this is something their shareholders care about. They are 
known for their aggressive techniques, but supplement their campaigns by consistently filing shareholder 
resolutions and voting proxies every year, as well as engaging in dialogues with prioritized companies. 
Investor C Profile:  
Investor C has is new to the SRI space, deciding only recently to become involved after realizing that many 
of their competitors are already quite active in the space. While they have proxy voted in years past, they 
recently passed a new proxy voting policy that incorporates their support of ESG issues. They also filed a 
handful of shareholder resolutions, mostly in coordination with other investors. They are in the process of 
developing their capacity to engage in other ways, such as influencing policy or taking legal action, but 
these plans have not come to fruition yet.  
 
 Investor A: Large SRI Investor 
 
These radar charts show the amount of activity 
this investor has across issue areas and activity types. The four smaller radar charts, below, break-down 
the distribution of issue areas in each of the four activity categories. This large SRI money manager is 
engaged across E, S, and G issues, and most of its activities involve the proxy process, though it also 
employs other methods such as policy, dialogue, and some assertive action. 
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 The two mosaic charts below show the proportion of this investor’s activities in each issue area and 
engagement activity category. The second mosaic chart shows the breakdown of “successful” and 
“unsuccessful” activities, with the darker shade representing the proportion of “successful” activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Investor B: Small, governance activist 
 
These radar charts show the amount of activity this investor has across issue areas and activity types. The 
four smaller radar charts, below, break-down the distribution of issue areas in each of the four activity 
categories. This small governance activist engages almost entirely on governance issues, but employs the 
entire spectrum of engagement activities.  
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 The two mosaic charts below show the proportion of this investor’s activities in each issue area and 
engagement activity category. The second mosaic chart shows the breakdown of “successful” and 
“unsuccessful” activities, with the darker shade representing the proportion of “successful” activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Investor C: Medium sized, low engagement investor 
 
 
 
These radar charts show the amount of activity this investor has across issue areas and activity types. The 
four smaller radar charts, below, break-down the distribution of issue areas in each of the four activity 
categories. This medium-sized investor has a low level of engagement. The vast majority of the 
engagements it has completed were using the proxy process, with a very small amount of dialogues and 
policy actions, and no assertive actions were taken.  
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 The two mosaic charts below show the proportion of this investor’s activities in each issue area and 
engagement activity category. The second mosaic chart shows the breakdown of “successful” and 
“unsuccessful” activities, with the darker shade representing the proportion of “successful” activities. 
 
 
 
 
 Comparison of Three Investors 
The same information as a stacked bar chart, where darker colors represent “successful” engagements: 
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 Investor Map of Equity Engagement Impact 
 
This last chart shows a potential output of the IE2 framework from hypothetical anonymized, aggregated 
data. The X-axis shows the number of engagement activities, while the Y-axis shows a weighted “impact” 
score that would account for the type of engagement, whether the investor played a leading role, and other 
factors that determine an engagement’s impact. The bubble size indicates the assets of the investor. The 
investors shown here are hypothetical investors, to demonstrate the range of information that could be 
generated with the further development of the IE2 framework. For example, the large blue bubble 
represents an investor similar to Investor A, which focuses on many issues and has a lot of impact. The 
green bubble is similar to Investor B, an investor which is highly engaged and focuses on a narrower range 
of issues. The orange bubble represents an investor like Investor C, which focuses its low number of 
engagements almost entirely on proxy-voting.  
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